Development and Preliminary Evaluation of a Social Cognition Intervention for Outpatients with Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders by Roberts, David
Development and preliminary evaluation of a social cognition intervention for outpatients 
with schizophrenia spectrum disorders 
 
David L. Roberts, M.A. 
 
A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at  
Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Psychology (Clinical). 
 
Chapel Hill 
2007 
 
Approved by: 
 
David Penn, Ph.D. 
 
Joseph Lowman, Ph.D. 
 
Jonathan Abramowitz, Ph.D 
 
Jennifer Snyder, Ph.D. 
 
Lawrence Sanna, Ph.D.
ii
Abstract 
Social functioning deficits (e.g., social skill, community functioning) are a core 
feature of schizophrenia.  These deficits are only minimally improved via the frontline 
treatments for schizophrenia (e.g. medication, social skills training, cognitive-behavioral 
therapy).  The current project addresses this limitation with the development of a 
psychosocial treatment for schizophrenia that targets social cognition. Social cognition is a 
set of cognitive processes applied to the recognition, adaptive processing, and effective use 
of social cues in real-world situations. This is a promising treatment target as social cognition 
may be more strongly related to social functioning outcomes than traditional neurocognitive 
domains (Couture, Penn, & Roberts, 2006). Consistent with expert consensus, Social 
Cognition and Interaction Training (SCIT) is being developed based on a four-stage model of 
treatment. This dissertation focuses on the first two stages of this model: Treatment 
conceputalization and manual development, followed by pilot testing with outpatients with 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders.  Two pilot trials were conducted, with the primary 
outcome of interest being social cognition (i.e., emotion perception, Theory of Mind, and 
attributional style).  Secondary outcomes included social skill and need for closure.  Study #1 
used a quasi-experimental design to assess efficacy in a North Carolina (NC) sample, and 
Study #2 used an uncontrolled, pre-post design to assess effectiveness in a New York (NY) 
sample. Results were generally promising, as SCIT participants in both studies showed 
evidence of improvement in most outcome domains. Results and implications are discussed. 
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Introduction 
Social Functioning in Schizophrenia 
Deficits in social functioning are among the hallmark features of schizophrenia 
(DSM-IV; APA, 1994). Across studies, the term “social functioning” has been 
operationalized in a broad array of ways, including self- and other-report of interpersonal 
behaviors, ratings of social skill based on laboratory role-plays, social problem solving 
performance, and effectiveness in community functioning (e.g. shopping, independent living, 
etc.). Despite this conceptual inconsistency, consensus agreement is that social dysfunction is 
more pronounced in schizophrenia than in any other major psychiatric disorder (Mueser & 
Bellack, 1998). This is borne out in research showing that over 85% of individuals with 
schizophrenia are unemployed (Blyler, 2003; Lehman, 1995; Melle, Hauf, & Vaglum, 2000) 
and that most individuals with schizophrenia (almost 90%) show consistent deficits in social 
skill over one year (Mueser et al. 1991).  Deficits in social functioning precede illness onset 
(Davidson, et al., 1999; Marenco & Weinberger, 2000; Pinkham, et al., 2007), persist 
following an initial psychotic episode despite remission of symptoms (e.g., Robinson et al., 
2004), are present in the first degree relatives of individuals with schizophrenia (Hans et al., 
2000), and represent a dimension of functioning relatively independent of positive and 
negative symptoms (Lenzenweger & Dworkin, 1996; McClellan et al., 2002).  Importantly, 
impairments in social functioning are significant predictors of outcome, such as relapse, poor 
illness course, and unemployment (Perlick et al. 1992; Sullivan et al. 1990).  In addition, 
there is a strong association between social functioning and both mental and physical health 
2(Rhodes & Lakey, 1999; Uchino et al. 1999; reviewed in Penn et al., 2004).  Thus, social 
functioning deficits are a key feature in the development, course, and long-term outcome of 
schizophrenia. 
The role of social dysfunction in schizophrenia goes beyond solely understanding the 
psychopathology of the disorder but has implications for individuals’ quality of life.  In 
particular, the majority of outpatients report having few, if any, close friends (Breier et al. 
1991; Randolph, 1998).  Moreover, individuals with schizophrenia consistently identify 
improved social functioning as a high priority (Bengtsson-Tops & Hansson, 1999; Wiersma 
et al. 1998).  For example, only 37% of a sample of clients with schizophrenia rated 
management of psychotic symptoms as a current need; instrumental support was rated higher 
(Slade et al., 1996).  In another study, individuals with schizophrenia rated social functioning 
as their area of greatest unmet need, and indicated that they were not receiving professional 
assistance in this domain (Middelboe et al., 2001).  Coursey et al. (1995) found that clients 
with schizophrenia rated “human concerns” as more important to their progress in therapy 
than illness-specific symptoms.  These findings are consistent with qualitative research 
showing that a goal for many individuals with schizophrenia is to find ways to connect with 
others and reduce social isolation (Corin, 1990; Corin & Lauzon, 1992, 1994; Davidson, 
Stayner, & Haglund, 1998), a need that may not be addressed by common psychosocial 
interventions such as Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy (Curtis, 1999; Tarrier et al., 1998).  
Thus, focusing on social impairments may directly address a fundamental human need 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Ryff & Singer, 1998), which in turn, may impact long-term 
recovery (Mueser et al. 2002). 
 
3Social Functioning and Neurocognition 
Given the importance of social dysfunction in schizophrenia, an emerging goal has 
been to elucidate the factors that underlie it, ostensibly for the purpose of informing 
treatments aimed at improving social functioning.  Neurocognitive functioning has been a 
prominent factor in this regard.  Reviews of the literature support a significant relationship 
between various indices of neurocognition (e.g., attention, executive functioning) and 
functional outcome, although the amount of variance accounted for is typically rather modest 
(Green, 1996; Green et al., 2000; McGurk & Mueser, 2004; Penn et al., 1997).  In fact, 
although Green et al. (2000) reported that 20-60% of the variance in functional outcome 
could be explained by composite measures of neurocognition, closer inspection of that 
review reveals that the variance accounted for by most of the studies was in the 20-40% 
range.  Thus, anywhere from 60-80% of the variance in functional outcome is unaccounted 
for by traditional neurocognitive measures. 
One rationale for identifying factors that relate to functional outcome is that they may 
prove to be sound targets for interventions (both pharmacological and psychosocial).  Thus, 
remediation of neurocognitive deficits should result in improvements in various indices of 
social functional outcome.  Unfortunately, this has not always been the case.  Although 
research has shown that deficits on particular neurocognitive tasks can indeed be 
significantly improved by cognitive training, there is inconsistent evidence of a significant 
impact on social outcomes (Kurtz et al., 2001; Pilling et al., 2002; Twamley et al., 2003), 
unless coupled with other psychosocial interventions such as vocational rehabilitation 
(McGurk et al., 2005; Wexler & Bell, 2005). This suggests that other factors underlie social 
impairments in schizophrenia and may be appropriate targets for psychosocial interventions.  
4Therefore, due to the modest associations between neurocognition and social 
functioning outcome, and limited generalizability of neurocognitive remediation, 
investigators have sought to identify domains of cognition that are relatively distinct from 
traditional neurocognitive domains, but that may have an independent link to social 
functioning (Penn, 1991; Penn et al., 1997) or serve as a potential mediator between 
neurocognition and social functioning (Green et al., 2000).  This has led to recent enthusiasm 
for the role of social cognition in schizophrenia (Green et al., 2005; Penn et al., 1997). 
Social Cognition 
Social cognition has been described as the “mental operations underlying social 
interactions, which include the human ability and capacity to perceive the intentions and 
dispositions of others” (Brothers, 1990, p.28).  A similar definition has been proposed by 
Adolphs (2001), who identified social cognition as “the ability to construct representations of 
the relation between oneself and others and to use those representations flexibly to guide 
social behavior” (p.231).  These definitions share the idea that social cognition is a set of 
related neurocognitive processes applied to the recognition, understanding, accurate 
processing, and effective use of social cues and information in real-world situations (Penn et 
al., 1997). 
Domains of social cognition 
The study of social cognition in schizophrenia has generally focused on three primary 
domains: Theory of Mind, attributional style, and emotion perception (Penn, Addington, & 
Pinkham, 2006; Green et al., 2005).   
Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the ability to represent human mental states and/or to 
make inferences about another’s intentions.  Skills that fall under the rubric of ToM include 
5understanding false beliefs, hints, intentions, deception, metaphor, irony, faux pas, and, 
regarding one’s own mental states, metacognition. In general, individuals with schizophrenia 
have deficits in both other-oriented ToM abilities (i.e., knowing what others are thinking) 
(reviewed in Brune, 2005a), and self-oriented or metacognitive ToM abilities (i.e., knowing 
one’s own thoughts or thinking about one’s own thinking; reviewed in Koren and Harvey, 
2006). Across most studies, these impairments are present regardless of whether individuals 
are acutely ill or in a period of symptom remission, although evidence of state-dependent 
variation exists (reviewed in Brune, 2005b).  In addition, ToM deficits are present across 
both inpatient and outpatient samples (Brunet et al. 2003; Langdon et al. 2002; Langdon et 
al., 1997; Sarfati, et al, 1999). Whereas ToM deficits are not uniquely associated with any 
specific symptom type (e.g., paranoia; Brune, 2005b), they may have different etiologies 
across disease subtypes (Bentall, 2001).  
Attributional style refers to explanations people give regarding the causes of positive 
and negative events in their lives.  The majority of work in schizophrenia has focused on 
attributional style in individuals with paranoia or persecutory delusions.  Research shows that 
individuals with persecutory delusions tend to blame others, rather than situations, for 
negative events, an attributional style known as a “personalizing bias” (Bentall et al., 2001; 
Garety & Freeman, 1999). This bias initially may stem from the tendency of deluded 
individuals to “jump to conclusions” or to make decisions based on limited information 
(reviewed in Garety & Freeman, 1999).  Jumping to conclusions is most prominent in 
individuals with persecutory delusions, but is also present among schizophrenia sufferers 
with other delusions (Dudley et al., 1997a; 1997b; Moritz & Woodward, 2005), and among 
individuals with delusional disorder (Conway et al., 2002).  
6Emotion perception research in schizophrenia (reviewed by Edwards et al. 2002; 
Hellewell & Whittaker, 1998; Kohler & Brennan, 2004; Mandal et al. 1998) suggests the 
following conclusions.  First, individuals with schizophrenia display abnormalities in facial 
affect perception compared to non-clinical control participants.  Second, these abnormalities 
are present relative to individuals with other psychiatric disorders such as depressive 
disorder; however, results are inconsistent when compared to disorders that include psychotic 
features, such as bipolar disorder.  Third, the greatest abnormalities are evident for the 
perception of negative emotional displays compared to positive displays, with abnormalities 
being most pronounced for the perception of fear. Fourth, longitudinal studies support a 
stable abnormality in emotion perception, although there is some evidence that individuals 
whose symptoms are in remission may perform more normatively on affect perception tasks 
than individuals in an acute phase of the disorder (Gessler, et al, 1989; Penn et al., 2000). 
Fifth, individuals with schizophrenia perform more abnormally in identifying abstract social 
cues (e.g., what a given individual is thinking or feeling) than concrete social cues (e.g., what 
a person is wearing or doing). Finally, individuals with schizophrenia display restricted 
visual scan paths and spend less time examining salient features of the face during emotion 
perception tasks (Green & Phillips, 2004), which may contribute to poor performance 
(Loughland et al., 2002a; 2002b; Williams et al., 1999). 
Differentiation of social cognition from neurocognition 
Social cognition has been distinguished theoretically from non-social cognition, or 
neurocognition, in several ways (reviewed in Fiske and Taylor, 1984; Jones, 1990). First, 
social cognitive stimuli more often include an affective charge (e.g. through facial 
expressions or vocal prosody) whereas nonsocial stimuli are typically affectively neutral (e.g. 
7numbers).  Second, intangible or unobservable stimulus qualities are crucial to social 
cognition (e.g. an individual’s unspoken preferences or intentions in a situation) but are less 
important in nonsocial cognition.  Third, the relationship between subject and object in social 
cognition is bidirectional, mutable, and mutually influencing. Over the course of a 
conversation, one continually reevaluates and reacts to one’s interlocutor, and both parties 
change as a function of the interaction.  Thus, social cognitive processes are influenced 
substantially both by the external social context and by the internal emotional reactions of the 
subject to the context. In contrast, the subject’s relationship to objects in nonsocial cognition 
tends to be unidirectional and static, and the objects generally do not change as a result of 
being observed.  Finally, whereas cognitive abnormalities are typically conceptualized in 
terms of incorrect or deficient processes, social cognitive abnormalities can be 
conceptualized as biases, or exaggerations of idiosyncratic response tendencies that vary 
across individuals in both normal and pathological populations (Penn et al., 1997).  
A number of lines of empirical evidence support the view that social cognition is 
relatively independent of traditional neurocogntive domains. First, performance on 
neurocognitive and social cognitive tasks is dissociable.  Specifically, Brunet et al. (2003) 
demonstrated that individuals with schizophrenia were able to complete cartoon sequences 
depicting physical causality, but not causality that required inferences about characters’ 
intentions.  Similarly, Cutting and Murphy (1990) asked participants questions about social 
information (i.e., social knowledge) and general knowledge, and discovered those with 
schizophrenia demonstrated the greatest impairment on the social knowledge task.  Similar 
dissociations can be found in individuals with brain damage and other neuropsychiatric 
disorders.  For example, individuals with frontal lobe damage (Anderson, et al., 1999; Blair 
8& Cipolotti, 2000; Fine et al. 2001) or prosopagnosia (Kanwisher, 2000) show significantly 
impaired performance in varying areas of social cognition such as ToM and facial 
processing, but have intact discrimination of non-social stimuli.  In contrast, individuals with 
Williams’ syndrome tend to show a relative strength in social cognitive abilities, such as the 
detection of basic emotions from faces and normal performance on first-order ToM tasks, but 
tend to have below normal intelligence and have deficits in other aspects of neurocognition 
(Jones et al. 2000; Tager-Flusberg et al., 1998).   
Second, there is evidence in support of differentiation on a neural level. One line of 
research supports the presence of a “social cognitive neural circuit,” incorporating the 
amygdala, fusiform gyrus, superior temporal sulcus, and prefrontal cortices (Adolphs, 2003; 
Blakemore & Frith, 2004; Lee et al., 2004; Phillips et al., 2003; Pinkham, Penn et al., 2003).  
For example, the amygdala has been found to play an important role in responses to 
emotional stimuli, particularly in the identification of the emotional significance of stimuli in 
general (Adolphs et al., 1999; Adolphs et al. 2002; Green & Phillips, 2004; Winston et al., 
2002), and negatively-valenced emotions in particular (Adolphs & Tranel, 2003).  Another 
line of research suggests that the human mirror neuron system (MNS) uniquely subserves the 
social cognitive tasks of interpreting others’ emotions, intentions, and states of mind (see 
below). Such specificity in neural circuitry might be one reason why individuals with WS 
show preserved social cognitive skills, despite sub-normal general intelligence.  Reiss et al. 
(2004) found that as compared to healthy persons, individuals with Williams syndrome 
showed decreased volume and gray matter densities in several regions comprising the visual-
spatial system, and increased volume and gray matter density in regions thought to subserve 
face and emotion processing, including the amygdala and superior temporal gyrus.  These 
9findings provide striking evidence for the relative independence of social and nonsocial 
cognitive neural systems.   
 Finally, performance on social cognitive tasks tends to be only moderately associated 
with neurocognitive performance (e.g., Penn et al., 1993).  This issue was originally framed 
within the context of whether deficits in social cognition reflect a specific impairment in 
facial emotion perception or a generalized performance deficit.  However, the typical 
“control” task in the majority of studies in this area was a face recognition test, which 
arguably falls under the rubric of social cognition (e.g., Kerr & Neale, 1993; Mueser et al., 
1996; Penn et al., 2000; Salem et al., 1996).  A more relevant way to address this issue is to 
examine the relationship between social cognition and traditional neurocognitive skills.  In 
general, the correlations between emotion perception and attention, memory, and executive 
processing range from .20 to .60 (Bozikas et al., 2004; Bryson et al., 1997; Kee, Kern, & 
Green, 1998; Kohler et al., 2000; Sachs et al., 2004; Schneider et al., 1995; Sergi & Green, 
2002; Sergi et al., 2006; Silver & Shlomo, 2001).  Composite measures of cognition have 
shown a significant association with social perception in one study (Lancaster et al., 2003), 
but not in others (Penn et al., 1996; Silver & Shlomo, 2001).  In addition, it appears that ToM 
is relatively independent of IQ (Brune, 2005b), except among individuals with severe 
negative symptoms (Bentall, 2001).  Therefore, neurcognition and social cognition appear to 
represent related, but non-redundant constructs. 
Functional significance of social cognition 
There is growing evidence that social cognition, particularly emotion perception and 
ToM, has a consistent relationship with functional outcomes (Appelo et al., 1992; Brune, 
2005a; Hooker & Park; 2002; Kee, et al., 2003; Mueser et al., 1996; Penn, et al., 2002; 
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Pinkham & Penn, 2006; Schenkel et al., 2005; Toomey, et al., 1997; reviewed in Couture et 
al., 2006).  In fact, some studies have shown that social cognition has a stronger relationship 
with functional outcome than neurocognition (Penn et al., 1996; Pinkham & Penn, 2006; 
Pollice et al., 2002; Vauth et al., 2004).  Other studies have shown that the relationship 
between social cognition and functional outcome cannot be explained by neurocognitive 
factors (Corrigan & Toomey, 1995; Ihnen et al., 1998; Poole et al. 2000), and that both 
domains appear to make independent contributions to functional outcomes (Addington et al. 
2005; Brune, 2005a; Roncone et al., 2002).  Recently, two studies have shown that social 
cognition (particularly social perception) may mediate the relationship between 
neurocognition (i.e., early visual perception) and community functioning (Brekke et al. 2005; 
Sergi et al., 2006).  Taken as a whole, this body of research strongly supports the role of 
social cognition in functional outcomes, thus underscoring its viability as an important 
treatment target (Couture et al., 2006). 
Can social cognition be improved? 
The importance of social cognition to social functioning has led to interventions that 
seek to improve this domain of functioning. To date, pharmacological intervention studies on 
social cognition have been rather limited.  Littrell et al. (2004) and Kee et al. (1998) found 
that Olanzapine and Risperidone, respectively, were associated with improved social 
perception relative to conventional antipsychotic medication.  However, both studies suffer 
from signfiicant limitations.  First, sample sizes were small, particularly for Kee et al. 
(N=18).  And second, Littrell et al. did not utilize random assignment.  Thus, these 
exploratory findings, although promising, require replication before confident conclusions 
can be drawn. 
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Greater attention has been given to psychosocial interventions.  These interventions 
can be conceptualized as either “targeted” or “broad-based” approaches. Targeted 
interventions focus on a single social cognitive ability (e.g. emotion perception), whereas 
broad-based interventions typically comprise a variety of psychosocial approaches, including 
cognitive remediation and social skills training, in addition to utilizing strategies for 
improving social cognitive skills.  
Targeted social cognitive interventions 
Targeted interventions have not been developed to improve Theory of Mind or 
attributional bias in schizophrenia. However, numerous studies have evaluated the 
effectiveness of targeted emotion perception interventions (Choi & Kwon, 2006; Frommann, 
et al., 2003; Penn & Combs, 2000; Russell, et al., 2006; Silver et al., 2004; Wolwer et al. 
2005). The majority of these interventions share a common approach. Based on the evidence 
of truncated and abnormal visual face scanning processes in schizophrenia (described above), 
they are guided by the hypothesis that abnormal emotion perception results from individuals’ 
looking too briefly at faces and looking at the wrong parts of faces. Correspondingly, these 
interventions consists of training individuals to focus on key facial features (i.e. eyes and 
mouth) while identifying posed expressions of emotion in static photographs. Reinforcement 
and corrective feedback are provided over a series of training trials. These studies have 
consistently yielded improved performance on standard emotion perception measures among 
individuals with schizophrenia. 
Limitations of targeted interventions. Despite promising results, these studies have 
several limitations. First, although their approach is consistent with the above-mentioned 
scan-path studies, and with principles of behavioral training, it lacks a theoretical framework 
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to explain why abnormal scanning occurs. Second, the empirical basis, stimuli, and training 
techniques are more consistent with neurocognitive remediation than social cognitive 
remediation. Specifically, training is designed to modify visual scanning of stimuli that are 
static, objective, and not mutually-observing. Additionally, facial stimuli in these paradigms 
are decontextualized, which threatens their internal validity (Kring & Stuart, 2005) because 
situational factors are known to strongly influence judgments of others’ emotion (reviewed in 
Jones, 1990). Finally, the majority of these studies did not evaluate whether improvements in 
emotion perception generalized to improvements in other social cognitive domains or, more 
importantly, to social functioning. Thus, these studies are also limited by substantial threats 
to external validity. 
Broad-based social cognitive interventions 
The two primary broad-based social cognitive interventions for schizophrenia are 
Integrated Psychological Therapy (IPT; Brenner et al., 1992) and Cognitive Enhancement 
Therapy (CET; Hogarty & Flesher, 1999). IPT and CET have different theoretical premises, 
but overlap in conceptualizing social cognition as a higher order function that is subserved by 
basic neurocognition. Thus, both interventions are hierarchically structured to provide 
neurocognitive triaining (i.e. cognitive remediation) prior to, and as a basis for, social 
cognitive improvement. These interventions have demonstrated improvements in several 
cognitive domains (Brenner, Kraemer, Hermanutz, & Hodel, 1990; Hodel, Merlo, Brenner, & 
Roder, 1989; Hogarty et al., 2004; Spaulding et al., 1999), as well as more limited 
improvements in social cognition and social functioning (Hogarty et al., 2004). 
Limitations of broad-based interventions. IPT and CET share several key limitations. 
First, the foundational status of neurocognition relative to social cognition has not been 
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empirically established (Penn et al., 2005). Thus, the question remains as to whether it is 
necessary to provide cognitive remediation in order to improve social cognition. Cognitive 
remediation is a time-, resource-, and labor-intensive process that involves multiple sessions 
per week for six months or more (Brenner et al., 1992; Hogarty & Flesher, 1999; Wykes, 
2001). If a stand-alone social cognitive intervention is sufficient to improve social cognition, 
then valuable clinician and client time may be spared. And as with the emotion perception 
interventions reviewed above, the intervention techniques used by IPT and CET are more 
consistent with the principles of cognitive remediation than with social cognitive theory. 
Additionally, neither IPT nor CET explicitly addresses the three major social cognitive 
domains that are known to be abnormal in schizophrenia—emotion perception, attributional 
style, and Theory of Mind—or the underlying processes that have been linked empirically 
with these domains (reviewed below).  
Social Cognition and Interaction Training (SCIT) was developed to address the 
limitations of existing social cognitive interventions. The following section summarizes the 
development of SCIT to date. 
Development  of SCIT 
The stage model of psychosocial treatment development 
 The stage approach to treatment development is a relatively recent innovation that is 
intended to facilitate the rapid and systematic progression of treatments from mere ideas to 
validated interventions with clear guidelines for client selection, and a well articulated range 
of applicability (Onken et al., 1997). Traditionally, Stage I entails conceptualization of the 
intervention and manual writing; Stage II entails feasability and pilot testing; Stage III entails 
controlled efficacy trials using manualized materials that showed promise in Stage II, as well 
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as research on mechanisms of therapeutic action (e.g. dismantling trials); and Stage IV 
entails research on the transportability of efficacious treatments to diverse populations, 
provider groups, and treatment settings (Onken et al., 1997). The logic of this ordering of 
Stages II and III stems from the view that evidence of a treatment’s efficacy, or internal 
validity, should be established in a controlled research environment prior to releasing the 
intervention for community use. Whereas this approach is logical from a scientific 
standpoint, in practice, bridging the gap between research findings and clinical practice has 
proven difficult, and many interventions that demonstrate efficacy fail to receive appropriate 
effectiveness evaluation (Dobson & Hamilton, 2002; Westen, 2002). There are multiple 
reasons for this gap, including limited incentives for community stakeholders to participate in 
effectiveness research (Addis & Krasnow, 2000), the difficulty of modifying established 
treatment programming in community and hospital clinics, and the favoring of internal 
validity research over external validity research by funding agencies and academic 
publishing houses (Dobson & Hamilton, 2002). Thus, the traditional stage model is a boon to 
the development of internally valid interventions, but has done little to overcome obstacles to 
the development of ecologically valid, transportable interventions. 
Modifying the stage model. Evaluation of SCIT began with an uncontrolled open pilot 
trial for inpatients with schizophrenia (Penn et al., 2005; described below). The promising 
results of this pilot study with inpatients motivated us to examine the feasibility and potential 
clincial benefits of SCIT for outpatients with schizophrenia (who are more clinically stable 
than inpatients).  This dissertation describes the development and initial evaluation of SCIT 
among outpatients in North Carolina and New York.  The NC trial was a controlled, quasi-
experimental trial funded by the Foundation of Hope (NC).  The NY trial represents a slight 
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deviation from the stage model, in that it gave us an opportunity to evaluate SCIT in 
treatment settings not directly associated with our research group.  This collaboration came 
about after we shared the preliminary results of the Penn et al. (2005) study at a professional 
meeting. Our research group was approached by several treatment providers in New York 
City who were interested in implementing SCIT. Mindful of the ethical and scientific pitfalls 
associated with disseminating unproven treatments, we developed agreements with these 
providers whereby they would implement open pilot trials of SCIT and collect outcome data, 
and our group would provide training, supervision, and analysis of collected data. 
Essentially, we elected to postpone randomized, controlled Stage III research pending further 
uncontrolled evidence of SCIT’s effectiveness and preliminary evidence of its feasability as a 
transportabile intervention. 
This model of collaboration presented several benefits. First, it enabled our 
collaborating providers to respond to the increasing pressures on treatment agencies to find 
ways to measure and evaluate their treatment programming without receiving additional 
funds or staffing to do so (Addis, Wade, & Hatgis, 1999). Second, it enabled our group to 
continue preliminary evaluation of SCIT while avoiding the pitfalls associated with narrowly 
focused efficacy research—specifically, the uncertain applicability of highly internally valid 
interventions to the complexities of real-world clinical practice (Abrahamson, 1999; Elliot, 
1998; Foxhall, 2000; Henry, 1998; Norcross; 1999). Thus, this approach enabled us to 
evaluate the feasibility of transporting SCIT into diverse settings, to receive feedback from 
these settings, and to modify the intervention accordingly before finalizing the techniques for 
tightly controlled efficacy trials. 
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The Stage I and II development of SCIT that preceded the currently proposed study is 
described below.  
Stage I: Therapy conceptualization and manual writing 
 The first step in developing SCIT was to translate the empirical literature into a model 
of social cognitive dysfunction, change process, and corresponding treatment techniques 
(Rounsaville et al., 2001). Our aims were to improve upon existing social cognitive 
interventions by: 1) establishing a sound basis in established social cognitive bias processes; 
2) incorporating emerging research on social cognitive dysfunction (i.e. mirror neuron 
simulation and metacognition research); 3) utilizing ecologically valid social cognitive 
stimuli, and; 4) explicitly linking social cognition to social functioning. We review each of 
these aims below. 
1) Basis in established social cognitive bias processes 
Despite evidence of the relative independence of social cognition from traditional 
neurocognitive domains, existing interventions are rooted in a cognitive remediation 
framework. Targeted interventions employ an attention shaping paradigm, whereas broad-
based interventions treat social cognition as epiphenomenal to neurocognition. Moreover, 
neither intervention approach incorporates the unique characteristics of social cognitive 
stimuli. 
Research on normative social cognitive processes provides a more appropriate 
framework for modeling bias in schizophrenia than cognitive remediation research does. 
Social psychologists have known for decades that social cognitive biases are commonplace 
among individuals without cognitive deficits. This is evidenced by the robustness of the 
correspondence bias ( a.k.a. the fundamental attribution error; Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones 
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& Harris, 1967), a foundational concept in the field of social psychology. Moreover, growing 
empirical evidence suggests that there is a high degree of continuity between psychological 
processes underlying psychotic and non-psychotic disorders (reviewed in Freeman & Garety, 
2003). Specifically, emotional and motivational factors affect the onset of symptoms across 
diagnostic categories. And last, many social cognitive tendencies in schizophrenia, such as 
the personalizing bias, are more consistent with psychological bias than with a 
neurocognitive deficit. Thus, the SCIT intervention is based on a psychological model of 
social cognitive dysfunction that is continuous with normative social cognitive bias 
processes. These normative processes and their implications for SCIT are summarized below. 
Affect-as-information research has demonstrated that a person’s mood state affects 
how s/he processes information in the environment (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994). 
Positive mood typically leads one to interpret the environment as harmless, and is associated 
with use of creative and heuristic information processing, whereas negative mood is 
interpreted as a signal that something in the environment is problematic, and results in 
cautious, analytical and constrained interpretive processing (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & 
Strack, 1990; Bodenhausen et al., 1994). This effect may be mediated by an automatic 
evaluation mechanism whereby a positive or negative valence is quickly assigned to 
environmental stimuli, prior to higher order, conscious interpretation (reviewed in Chartrand, 
van Baaren, & Bargh, 2006).  
Importantly, the impact of affect-as-information effects hinges on the individual 
being unaware of the cause of his or her mood (Chartrand & Bargh, 2002; Schwarz & Clore; 
1983). Individuals with schizophrenia may be at greater risk for affect-as-information effects 
because this disorder is associated with cognitive disorganization and alexithymia (i.e. 
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difficulty identifying and describing one’s emotions; Cedro et al., 2001; Stanghellini & 
Ricca, 1995; Kring & Werner, 2004), as well as greater frequency of negative emotional 
experience (Kring, 1999). Thus, this effect is incorporated into the SCIT model. 
Attributional bias. As in schizophrenia, non-ill individuals demonstrate the tendency 
to automatically make dispositional attributions to explain apparently negative behaviors by 
others. For example, if you meet someone and he is not friendly, you might initially infer that 
he is a rude person.  This is consistent with affect-as-information research in linking negative 
experience with simplified interpretation processes. However, non-ill individuals often 
subsequently correct for situational factors (Gilbert et al. 1988).  If you subsequently learn 
that the rude person had just received bad news (e.g., someone in his family had died), you 
are likely to correct your initial personalizing impression in light of this contextual 
information. Nonetheless, even in non-ill individuals, this corrective mechanism often fails 
due to situational, motivational, and affective factors. Examples include expectancy effects 
(reviewed in Jones, 1990), cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), and the self-serving bias 
(Miller & Ross, 1975).  
Bentall and colleagues (Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994) use this attribution 
research as the foundation for their model of social cognitive dysfunction in paranoid-type 
schizophrenia. Their “attribution – self-representation cycle” model posits that paranoid 
individuals are motivated to employ biased causal attributions of events in order to support 
an unrealistic self image, on which they draw to make further biased attributions.  This 
theory is contextualized within a range of experimental findings that link paranoid delusions 
to implicit low self-esteem (Lyon, Kaney, & Bentall, 1994), jumping to conclusions (Garety, 
Helmsley, & Wessely, 1991; Huq, Garety, & Helmsley, 1988), externalizing (Kaney & 
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Bentall, 1989) and personalizing attributional biases (Kinderman & Bentall, 1997), and 
attentional bias towards threatening cues in the environment (Bentall & Kaney, 1989; Fear 
Sharp, & Healy, 1996), especially cues that are threatening to one’s self image (e.g., 
indications of judgment by others; Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994; Kinderman & 
Bentall, 1996b). This cycle enables threatening social cues to be quickly identified and 
categorized, thereby minimizing dissonance and distress.  
Need for Closure (NFC) is a motivational construct that has been found to contribute 
to social cognitive bias in both non-ill and schizophrenia-spectrum populations. NFC refers 
to the strong desire for an answer, even if it is incorrect, and a corresponding aversion to 
ambiguity or uncertainty (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993). Studied as a lay epistemic 
construct in social psychology, high NFC has been linked to increased correspondence bias 
in person perception (Webster, 1993), increased reliance on stereotypes (Fiske & Neuberg, 
1990; Jamieson & Zanna, 1989; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983), and decreased willingness to 
be persuaded by others in interpersonal situations (Kruglanski et al., 1993). As a possible 
motivational mechanism underlying delusions, two independent research groups have found 
a relationship between NFC and delusion-proneness in non-psychotic samples (Colbert & 
Peters, 2002; McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2006), while Bentall and Swarbrick (2003) 
found that individuals with delusions exhibited elevated NFC independent of symptom 
severity. 
These processes (affect-as-information, attributional bias, and NFC), which have been 
observed in both non-ill and schizophrenia-spectrum populations, are central to the SCIT 
model. 
2) Emerging research on social cognitive dysfunction 
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The biases discussed above are one route by which maladaptive social cogntive 
processes may emerge and maintain. However, a limitation of this literature is its relative 
neglect of ToM and emotion perception abnormalities in schizophrenia. It was important to 
address these domains in SCIT because they are not appropriately addressed in existing 
social cognitive intervetions (as discussed above). We found that we were able to incorporate 
ToM and emotion perception into our model by drawing on emerging research in two areas: 
mirror neuron simulation and metacognition. 
 Mirror neuron simulation 
Neural simulation research provides a framework that compliments our bias-based 
model, specifies etiological mechanisms that are distinct from traditional neurocognitive 
functions, and has clear implications for intervention. This framework and its treatment 
implications for SCIT are summarized below. 
The ability to mentally simulate other people’s internal states has been theorized to be 
the key mechnism underlying both emotion perception (summarized in Adolphs, 2002) and 
ToM (reviewed in Carruthers & Smith, 1996; Davies & Stone, 1995). Emerging 
neuroimaging research on the mirror neuron system (MNS) provides empirical support and 
an integrative framework for these theories (Gallese et al., 1996; Gallese & Goldman, 1999). 
The MNS is a specialized neural circuit involved in representations of bodily movement 
(Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). It is activated both when an individual performs a specific 
motor task (e.g. nodding one’s head) and when the individual observes a conspecific 
performing that same task. In the latter case, this circuit activates both a neural simulation of 
the action (nodding) as well as collateral representations relating to the meaning and goal of 
the action (e.g., “Yes” or “I agree”). Because this function enables individuals to represent 
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mental states that are inconsistent with their own (e.g., if you did not agree with whatever the 
conspicific was nodding about), it provides a basic mechanism for ToM (Davies & Stone, 
1995; Gallese & Goldman, 1998).  
Simulation theories of emotion perception include other-oriented as well as self-
oriented versions. These posit that a viewer identifies another’s emotion by automatically 
simulating the motor movements associated with the perceived facial expression, thereby 
triggering in the viewer the emotional state that typically accompanies that facial expression. 
This emotional state is then used to generate corresponding conceptual knowledge about the 
state. The self-oriented “facial feedback” theory (Thompkins, 1962) posits that one derives 
conceptual understanding of one’s own emotional state by proprioceptive reference to one’s 
facial expression of emotion. Several lines of empirical research support these thoeries, and 
suggest that they are complimentary. Emotion expression and experience are correlated 
(Rosenberg & Ekman, 1994); alexithymia (the ability to identify and describe one’s one 
emotions) and facial emotion recognition ability are correlated (Parker, Taylor, & Bagby, 
1993);  producing emotional facial expressions can influence emotional experience (Adelman 
& Zajonc, 1989) as well as autonomic (Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990) and EEG 
correlates of that emotion (Ekman & Davidson, 1993); and viewing facial expressions of 
emotion causes corresponding changes in emotion (Schneider, Gur, Gur, & Muenz, 1994; 
Wild, Erb, & Bartles, 2001), as well as subtlely detectable facial mimicry of the viewed 
emotion (Dimberg, 1982; Jaencke, 1994; Hess & Blairy, 2001).  
Findings from MNS research are consistent with both other- and self-oriented 
emotion perception thoeries. MNS research has demonstrated that when a facial expression is 
either enacted or observed, the motor correlate is activated in the observer’s MNS, and 
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collateral projections extend from the MNS into the limbic system, where they elicit 
emotional reactions associated with the represented facial expression (Carr et al., 2003). For 
example, if you either smile or see a person smile, the MNS automatically represents the 
action of smiling in your brain, followed by the limbic correlate, that is, happiness.  
Finally, the MNS may also play a role in how people make attributions of 
intentionality in others (Fogassi et al., 2005). As in emotion perception, when perceived 
motor movements from a conspecific are coupled with a simulation of these movements 
within the viewer, they generate collateral neural activation. Whereas emotion perception 
draws on collateral limbic activation, intentionality attributions appear to draw on self-
behavior expectancies associated with the observed movement. For example, if you see a 
person pick up a baseball bat, whether your MNS activates the expectancy that the person is 
preparing to play or preparing to fight will depend on your behavioral tendencies and past 
experiences.  In either case, the intentionality representation is generated automatically by the 
MNS, without conscious consideration.  
Mirror simulation in clinical populations. Direct empirical support linking MNS 
functioning to social-cognitive abnormality comes mostly from autism research. Like 
schizophrenia, autism is charcterized by social conitive deficits (Travis & Sigman, 1998).  In 
autism, MNS underactivation has been associated with ToM abnormalities (Williams, 
Waiter, & Gilchrist, 2006), as well as emotion perception abnormalities and, most 
importantly, social functioning deficits (Dapretto et al., 2006).  
Support for the role of simulation abnormalities in schizophrenia derives from 
disparate sources. First, schizophrenia is associated with deficits across the various domains 
of the putative emotion simulation circuit, including emotion perception, recognition of 
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emotion in one’s self (i.e. alexithymia), and behavioral expression of emotion (i.e. flattened 
affect; DSM-IV; APA, 1994). Second, Penn and Combs (2000) have demonstrated the 
effectiveness of a simulation theory-based emotion perception intervention. Prompting 
participants to mimic the facial expressions of pictured individuals led to improved emotion 
perception performance that was on par with non-clinical controls. Unfortunately, this study 
did not measure MNS activation or social functioning.  
Simulation and social behavior. Automatic neural simulation is a mechanism by 
which initial emotional and evaluative reactions to the social environment may take place. 
This likely primes early affective valencing, as indicated in affect-as-information research 
(discussed above), and may contribute to the initial personalizing attributional biases seen 
across clinical and non-clinical populations, setting the stage for negatively-valenced 
behavioral reactions. Research on the so-called “chameleon effect,” has shown that 
individuals who engage in greater automatic behavioral mimicry of interlocutors’ behavior  
score higher on trait-empathy measures (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Additionally, in an 
experimental setting, confederates’ subtle mimicry of their interlocutors’ posture and 
movements improved interpersonal meshing and led to their being liked more by participants 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). These findings suggest that an intervention designed to increase 
cognitive and behavioral simulation behaviors may improve both one’s ability to “feel into” 
the experience of others and to behave in a way that  increases social desireability. This 
implication is consistent with the literature on relationship formation, which suggests that 
reciprocity is one of the most important contributors to the establishment of adult friendships 
(Curtis & Miller, 1986; Fehr & Baldwin, 1996).  
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Among individuals with schizophrenia, those who exhibit less behavioral 
expressiveness and reciprocity in social interactions experience poorer marital (Hooley et al., 
1987), family, and communty relationships (Bellack et al., 1990). In holding with the 
chameleon effect, healthy individuals interacting with individuals with schizophrenia exhibit 
less expressiveness themselves, and report experiencing heightened sadness and fear (Krause 
et al., 1992).  More broadly, individuals with schizophrenia have a dearth of friendships 
(reviewed in the introduction), and their social relationships are typically characterized by 
lack of reciprocity, in that they receive care and succorance, but fail to provide it in return 
(Cohen & Kochanowics, 1989; Cohen & Sokolovsky, 1978; Dailey et al., 2000; Wallace, 
1984), leaving primary social contacts feeling over-burdened (Tolsdorf, 1976). This occurs 
despite substantial evidence that individuals with schizophrenia desire emotionally intimate 
relationships (reviewed above, and in Davidson et al., 1998). Whereas relational reciprocity 
on the level of resources and time allocation have been recorded in social relationships 
among individuals with severe mental illnesses (Dunn et al., 1990; Lovell, 1992), these 
individuals nonetheless fail to provide the kind of immediate empathic reciprocity that 
enables deep, lasting, healthy relationships.  
In sum, the literature in this section suggests that a form of mimicry training (e.g. 
Penn & Combs, 2000) may enhance both social cognition and empathic reciprocity behaviors 
among individuals with schizophrenia. 
Metacognition 
Metacognition refers to one’s ability to evaluate and monitor one’s state of mind, 
cognitive abilities, and performance, and to use this insight to regulate activity in these 
domains (Nelson & Narens, 1990). As indicated above, metacognition has been 
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conceptualized as a subcomponent of Theory of Mind (Wellman, 1990), as it entails 
recognizing and labeling one’s own mental states. It has also been conceptualized as a more 
sophisticated ability than ToM, because it involves actively using this self-knowledge to 
achieve personal goals (Bartsch & Estes, 1996). Metacognition varies independent of 
cognitive ability (Schneider, 1999), and has been implicated in the maintenance of symptoms 
in various mental disorders, including anxiety (Wells, 1995) and schizophrenia (Morrison, 
Haddock, & Tarrier, 1995). 
Recently, Koren and colleagues have demonstrated that metacognition is a stronger 
predictor of insight (Koren et al., 2004) and of competence (Koren et al., 2005) in 
schizophrenia than is executive functioning. (Note: executive functioning is a particularly 
robust predictor of community outcomes in schizophrenia; Green, 1996; Green, Kern, Braff, 
& Mintz, (2000), and thus has received a great deal of attention, particularly from cognitive 
rehabilitation programs, e.g., Bellack, Gold, & Buchanan, 1999).  In their studies, Koren et 
al. used a metacognitive version of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), a frequently 
used measure of executive functioning that requires participants to sort a series of picture 
cards into one of four piles. Participants learn after each card whether their decision was 
correct or incorrect. Koren and colleagues inserted two probes between participants’ answer 
for each card, and their receipt of feedback. First, they were asked to judge how confident 
they were in the correctness of their answer, and second they were asked whether they would 
like their answer to count towards their total score on the task. Responses to these probes 
more strongly predicted insight and competence scores than did traditional WCST 
performance indices. These findings have led to metacognition being held up as a likely 
mediator of functional outcome in schizophrenia.  
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From an intervention standpoint, Koren and Harvey (2006) have suggested that 
metacognitive monitoring may be used to decrease social-cognitive bias by making oneself 
aware of factors affecting one’s thinking, such as affective states, goals, and biases. 
Treatment application  
Based on the literature above, specific SCIT intervention techniques have been 
developed to address attributional bias, ToM abnormalities, and emotion perception 
abnormalities. 
Individuals with schizophrenia are vulnerable to making hasty attributions based on 
incomplete information and limited metacognitive awareness. Because these judgments may 
be automatic, preceding conscious processing of a situation, SCIT teaches clients to pause 
before reacting, to identify their initial cognitive and emotional reaction to the situation, and 
to frame it as only the first of several possible guesses. Several strategies are then used to 
generate additional personal and situational attributions, and to differentiate facts from 
guesses, prior to responding behaviorally. The goal in these exercises is not to identify the 
optimal response using an explicit, logical approach, as recent research and theory suggests 
that holistic, implicit reasoning is more effective in making complex judgments (Dijksterhuis 
& Nordgren, 2006), including in social situations (Hogarty & Flesher, 1999).  Instead, the 
goal is to slow the formulation of a final judgment, to expose individuals to salient alternative 
perspectives, and to maximize the information to which individuals have access in making 
their judgments. Essentially, they are helped to answer the relatively simple, metacognitive 
questions, “Do I have enough information to be sure that my first guess is right?”, “Are my 
emotions affecting my guess?”, and “Could I gather more information that would help me be 
more confident in my guess?” 
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Regarding emotion perception and ToM, simulation research posits that these 
domains may be improved by exercising clients’ use of the various nodes of the emotion 
processing circuit: behavioral expression, internal simulation, and conceptual identification. 
This is attempted in SCIT in several ways. Over the course of the intervention, clients are 
prompted to monitor, identify, and describe their own emotional states with greater 
specificity and frequency. Clients mimic the facial expressions, utterances, and actions of 
others while making judgments about the others’ thoughts, emotions, and intentions (as in 
Penn & Combs, 2000). And various techniques are used to help clients take the perspective 
of characters in video-taped vignettes or of peers in the treatment group.  
3) Ecologically valid social cognitive stimuli 
As summarized in an earlier section, social cognitive stimuli are theoretically 
distinguished from traditional neurocognitive stimuli in several key respects. These stimulus 
characteristics were incorporated into SCIT in several ways. First, to address dynamism and 
affective charge in social stimuli, SCIT bolsters the used of static social photographs with 
dynamic photographs (i.e. “morphs”) that progress from neutral expressions into strongly 
expressed emotions, and video-taped social interactions that include emotional expression. 
Participants are also socialized to describe, and ultimately role-play, interactions from their 
own lives that led to emotional arousal.  Second, the unobservable qualities of social stimuli 
are addressed by using various techniques to illustrate and reinforce the distinction between 
social appearances and social facts. For example, video vignettes are viewed and discussed 
which depict dissociations between what is stated and what is meant (e.g. lying). Third, the 
influence of situational and emotional factors on social cognitive processing is normalized 
throughout the intervention. Therapists frame social cognitive missteps, including jumping to 
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conclusions and paranoia, on a continuum, and normalize them through self-disclosure and 
video depictions. And finally, therapists reinforce the perspective that ambiguity is the rule 
and black-and-white clarity the exception in understanding social situations. 
4) Linking social cognition to social functioning 
A conceputal framework for understanding the interplay of social cognitive 
impairment and social 
dysfunction in 
schizophrenia is 
depicted in Figure 1. 
This figure depicts the 
reaction of a person 
with paranoid 
schizophrenia (PD) to 
a co-worker who has 
rushed past him without saying hello. Prior to the event PD has negative expectancies and 
data gathering biases. He is hyper-attentive to threatening social cues, especially to negative 
cues regarding his self-image. These biases are initially manifest in his briefly scanning the 
passing co-worker’s face and not focusing on key features.  PD quickly concludes that the 
co-worker is angry (emotion perception), which he does based on limited information 
(jumping to conclusions) and without imagining what he himself feels like when he has a 
similar expression on his face (mirror simulation failure).  After this initial conclusion, PD 
briefly considers why the co-worker is angry. Due to problems in putting himself in the co-
worker’s position (ToM, simulation impairment), and ongoing negative expectancies, PD 
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quickly concludes that the co-worker must be an ill-willed person who is unjustly angry at 
him (personalizing bias).  Because PD does not entertain other reasons for the co-worker’s 
behavior (Need for Closure), his certainty in this conclusion grows.  This results in PD 
feeling angry and resentful toward the co-worker, which causes PD to act in an unfriendly 
and avoidant manner toward the co-worker in the future, who in turn, avoids PD.  This 
culminates in an increase in PD’s general discomfort at work, thus affecting life satisfaction, 
and reinforcing a vicious cycle whereby PD anticipates negative interactions in the future, 
but doesn’t seek information that may contradict these expectations (Woodward et al., 2006).  
Thus, his relationships at work become increasingly strained. 
Summary of the SCIT intervention 
SCIT was developed based on the conceptualization outlined above. Early iterations 
of SCIT modules were tested during the spring of 2003 in an inpatient social skills training 
group at John Umstead Hospital. Based on this clinical experience, we further developed the 
intervention and wrote the first draft of the treatment manual in the summer of 2003. We 
used seed funds to hire university actors to portray various social-cognitive difficulties (e.g., 
jumping to conclusions) in video vignettes which could be used throughout the SCIT 
protocol.   
SCIT was developed as a group-based intervention for individuals with schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders.  It is comprised of three phases: Emotion Training, Figuring out 
Situations, and Integration (a.k.a. “Checking it out”), which are summarized below.  SCIT is 
delivered by two therapists over 20-24 weekly sessions, with each session lasting 
approximately one hour. The total number of sessions can be varied to match the rate at 
which clients work through the material. Materials include a trainer’s manual, laminated 
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photographs of social scenes, computerized images of faces, and film clips of social 
encounters.   
 
Outline of SCIT 
Phase Number of sessions 
Emotion training 7-8 
Figuring out situations 8-9 
Integration – Checking it out 5-7 
Phase 1. Emotion training. The primary goals of Phase 1 are to provide information 
about emotions and their relationship to thoughts and situations, define the basic emotions, 
improve emotion perception, and teach clients to distinguish between justified and unjustified 
suspiciousness. Additionally, clients begin to practice describing and monitoring emotions in 
themselves, a skill that is reinforced throughout the entirety of the intervention. 
We begin this phase by discussing how thoughts and feelings affect behavior in social 
situations.  Clients are asked to provide examples of times when they may have gotten a 
social situation “wrong,” and/or jumped to a conclusion.  To help clients identify such 
situations, a video vignette is shown in which a young woman interprets a friend’s irritation 
as being directed toward her rather than being the result of something that she wasn’t aware 
of (i.e., the friend spilling a drink on her term paper).  The use of video vignettes throughout 
SCIT serves three primary purposes: First, they provide relatively ecologically valid models 
of how social cognitive errors can occur; second, they strengthen ToM and simulation 
abilities, as we prompt clients to put themselves in the place of the actors; and third, they 
31
heighten engagement in the group by providing a familiar form of entertainment (watching 
television). 
In sessions 2-3, clients discuss how feelings affect perception of situations, and how 
situations can affect feelings.  Clients are asked to identify emotions that they have felt 
recently and how they relate to situations that have occurred. This helps clients appreciate 
that emotions are not random, but context-specific. This exercise is the basis for “check-ins” 
that will occur briefly at the beginning of each remaining SCIT session. The difficulty, detail, 
and amount of self-disclosure associated with emotional check-ins are increased over the 
course of the intervention. 
Sessions 4-6 involve emotion training.  This begins with a conceptual-level exercise 
in which clients use brainstorming to generate a list of all the emotions they can think of.  
This list is summarized on a flip chart, which is coined “the emotion poster.”  The therapists 
then ask clients to see if any themes cut across the emotion list, which ultimately leads to 
grouping emotions into the following categories: Happy, angry, sad, afraid, surprised, 
ashamed, and suspicion.  
Once the emotion poster is created, clients complete the Emotion Trainer, which is a 
computer program that has been shown to improve emotion perception in schizophrenia 
(Silver et al., 2004).  The Emotion Trainer presents 20 faces to participants, whose task is to 
identify the emotion that the target face is expressing.  We have found that administering the 
emotion trainer in the context of a game improves engagement.  For example, clients might 
be asked to write down their answer and then “vote” on the correct response.  We also 
encourage clients to mimic the target facial expressions to enhance emotion simulation 
abilities. When clients make guesses about the target’s emotional expression, they are asked 
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to identify the behavioral cues they are using to make their guesses.  For example, a face 
might be identified as happy if the eyes are wide and the mouth grinning.  These behavioral 
cues are added to the list of primary emotions on the emotion poster and they are referred to 
throughout SCIT (not just in this phase). Also, by forcing clients to focus on behavioral cues, 
we believe that we are strengthening their data gathering (i.e., gaze) strategies and 
diminishing possible avoidance of emotionally salient features (e.g., eyes and mouth).  
One limitation of the emotion trainer is that the target faces are static.  Therefore, we 
supplement the emotion trainer with an exercise called “Updating Emotion Guesses,” which 
includes dynamic facial expressions.  In this exercise, we seek to teach clients that facial 
expressions are subtle and changeable, thus, one needs to focus on key aspects of the face, 
and be willing to withhold firm judgment and be willing change ones guesses in response to 
changing social information (we return to this issue in Phase 2).  This exercise is comprised 
of 4 different target faces.  Each target face, in turn, is presented over six trials, which vary in 
how expressive the face is (from neutral to very expressive).  As in the emotion trainer, 
clients can vote in their response.  However, this time, they comment on how the facial 
expression changes, which may lead them to change their minds, thus encouraging 
willingness to modify initial guesses based on new information. 
In the final two sessions of this phase, we frame suspiciousness/paranoia as one of the 
primary emotions.  This is meant to normalize suspicious feelings, as varying degrees of 
suspiciousness occur in the general population (Johns & van Os, 2001).  This also provides 
rationale for emotional self-monitoring, helping clients to see the role that their internal states 
can have on their interpretation of their environment (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). We 
distinguish between justified suspiciousness and unjustified suspiciousness and point out that 
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unjustified suspiciousness can get us in trouble or cause distress, and may be activated in 
vague or ambiguous situations (Green & Phillips, 2004).  To achieve these goals, we show 
video-clips of characters acting suspicious across a variety of situations that vary in whether 
or not their feelings are justified, which then leads to group discussion of why the 
suspiciousness may or may not be appropriate, and the possible interpersonal repercussions 
of unjustified paranoia.  
 
Emotion Training 
Goals Techniques 
• Provide information about 
emotions and their relationship to 
thoughts and situations 
• Define basic emotions, including 
paranoia 
• Improve emotion perception and 
emotional guesses 
• Normalize paranoia 
• Distinguish between justified and 
unjustified suspiciousness 
• Psychoeducation 
• Within session and homework 
assignments requiring clients to identify 
their feelings and the feelings of others 
in different situations 
• Making an “emotion poster,” that links 
emotions to specific facial expressions 
• Use of the emotion trainer and the 
modified micro-expression task to 
improve emotion perception  
• Imitation of facial expressions 
• Video-clips of individuals making social 
cognitive mistakes while interacting 
with other people. 
Phase 2. Figuring out situations. The primary goals of Phase 2 are to help clients 
appreciate the potential pitfalls of jumping to conclusions, and to teach and practice several 
strategies to decrease the tendency to jump to conclusions in social situations. These 
strategies are: 1) Practice generating both personal and situational attributions for negative 
events; 2) Distinguish between social “facts” and social “guesses,” and; 3) Gather more 
information before making judgments. 
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We begin phase two by introducing the notion of jumping to conclusions.  To 
facilitate discussion, we show video-clips of actors jumping to conclusions and also 
encourage clinicians to share experiences in which they jumped to a wrong conclusion.  We 
then discuss factors that are associated with jumping to conclusions, including the tendency 
to blame others (i.e., a personal attribution) rather than situations for negative outcomes 
(Freeman et al., 2004; Garety et al., 2005).  Clients are presented with a series of fictional 
vignettes (e.g., a friend was supposed to come to your house but they didn’t show up) and 
they are asked to brainstorm the various reasons why the friend didn’t call back.  In 
collaboration with group members, we distinguish between personal attributions (e.g., the 
friend was angry at you) and situational attributions (e.g., a family emergency came up), and 
how these attributions can lead to different feelings. 
Clients’ personal attributions are often prefaced by statements such as “I feel that my 
friend did…” or “I felt that she meant…,” which reflect emotional reasoning.  In other words, 
clients’ are using their affect as a source of information (Clore et al., 1994), thus basing their 
conclusions on feelings rather than facts.  This is compounded by the fact that individuals 
with schizophrenia have particular difficulty with abstract social cues (Corrigan & Green, 
1993).  To address this issue, we spend a few sessions teaching clients to be better “social 
detectives.”  Clients view a series of photographs and are taught to distinguish between facts 
(i.e., tangible physical characteristics, such as who is in the photograph, what they are 
wearing, what is in the room, etc.) and guesses (i.e., what the characters are feeling, thinking, 
intending, etc).  Several exercises are used to help clients distinguish facts from guesses, For 
example, clients independently generate facts and guesses about a photograph and then 
compare answers.  Typically, there is high agreement on facts (e.g., there are three people in 
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the picture) but lower agreement on guesses (e.g., they are friends).  The ultimate goal is to 
draw conclusions from situations based on facts and to refrain from interpretations based on 
“feelings” and guesses. 
In the final two sessions of phase two, we play a variation of the game, 20 Questions, 
designed to strengthen clients’ ability to tolerate ambiguity and to make judgments in a 
socially charged context.  Each client is given 10 points and a target person (initially one of 
the therapists) thinks of a simple object such as a fruit or vegetable.  Taking turns, clients 
receive one point for asking a yes-no question about the object (e.g., “is it green?”), after 
which they can choose to make a guess about the identity of the object and bet points, or 
refrain from betting until they have more information.  Once clients have learned the rules of 
the game, we shift the target object from fruits and vegetables to client likes and dislikes 
(e.g., hobbies).  This increases the personal relevance of the activity and also taps into ToM 
skills. 
Throughout Phase 2 we continue to reinforce simulation skills by prompting clients to 
articulate and mimic from a first-person perspective the thoughts, experiences, emotions, 
body language, and facial expressions of characters depicted in video vignettes. Increasingly, 
clients are also prompted to try to simulate the internal states of group therapists and fellow 
clients, as in the likes/dislikes version of 20 Questions. 
Figuring out Situations 
Goals Techniques 
• Teach clients not to jump to 
conclusions 
• Decrease need for closure in social 
situations 
• Learn distinction between personal 
and situational attributions 
• Video-clips of actors/actresses jumping 
to conclusions and making personal 
rather than situational attributions 
• Brainstorming of causes for social 
situations/outcomes 
• Use of photographs to teach clients how 
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• Learn how to distinguish “facts” 
from “guesses” 
to distinguish facts from guesses 
• Playing a modified version of 20 
Questions to strengthen data gathering 
and help clients better tolerate 
ambiguity 
Phase 3. Integration: Checking it out. The primary goals of Phase 3 are to assess facts 
and guesses surrounding events in clients’ personal lives, recognize that it is sometimes 
necessary to obtain more information about social situations, and to teach effective social 
skills for checking out guesses. The purpose of the final phase is to put into practice what 
clients have learned in SCIT.  One can view the phases of SCIT as moving from “cold” 
social cognition in phase one (i.e. social cognition for non-personal events) to “hot” social 
cognition in phase three (i.e., application of social cognitive skills to personally-relevant 
situations; Brenner et al., 1992).  We have done this intentionally, so as to allow clients to 
learn social cognitive skills without becoming over-aroused or defensive. 
We begin this last phase by showing clients video-clips of actors “checking out” their 
impressions or interpretations with other people.  The purpose is to emphasize that even 
when going through the process of sorting out facts from guesses, we might not feel better 
about the situation unless we obtain more information.   For example, one client was upset 
because his psychologist didn’t show up for his team meetings.  His guesses about why this 
happened included: 1) the psychologist doesn’t care about him; 2) she is too busy, or 3) that 
she has a scheduling conflict.  The client had less confidence in the first guess, because the 
psychologist was always friendly to him when they saw each other on the unit.  Thus, he 
thought that the other two guesses might be true.  However, he continued to have the nagging 
feeling that the psychologist didn’t like him.  Therefore, the client was asked to generate a 
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variety of “checking it out strategies” (e.g., confronting the psychologist; asking another 
team member why the psychologist wasn’t at the meetings, etc) and then, with assistance 
from the group, to choose one and role play it.  This exercise is meant to strengthen both 
metacognitive skills (Koren et al. 2005), that is, knowing when one needs more information, 
as well as social skills, by following well-established guidelines for role playing (Bellack, 
Mueser, & Gingerich 2004). 
 
Integration: Checking it out 
Goals Techniques 
• Collaboratively (with the group) 
assess the facts/guesses surrounding 
events in different members’ lives 
• Recognize that it is sometimes not 
possible to make good guesses 
without getting more information 
• Teach effective social skills for 
checking out guesses 
• Video-clips of actors/actresses 
checking out their impressions 
• Use the “check-in” procedure for 
eliciting personal situations 
• Integrate facts/guesses exercise with 
social skills training 
Stage II: Feasibility and pilot testing of SCIT 
Inpatient pilot study #1 
Once the SCIT intervention was conceptualized and an initial draft of the manual was 
written, we conducted an initial uncontrolled pilot trial of the intervention. Our goals with 
this trial were: 1) Evaluate the feasibility of the intervention; 2) Evaluate the clinical benefits 
of SCIT, and; 3) Collect feedback from clients and providers to be used in refining the 
treatment manual (Rounsaville, et al., 2001). 
The pilot study was conducted among seven individuals who were inpatients at 
Dorothea Dix Hospital, had chronic psychotic illnesses (mean = 12.6 years of illness, SD = 
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5.3), and had difficulties interacting with peers (as judged by their treatment team).  
Participants were an average of 39.5 years old (SD=8.0) and were predominantly male (n = 
5), Caucasian (n = 5), and diagnosed with schizophrenia (n = 4). 
SCIT groups were led by the primary author (DLR) and a master’s level psychologist 
(Penn rotated in to observe on a regular basis).  Assessments were conducted at baseline and 
post-treatment and included symptoms (i.e., the Brief Symptom Inventory, BSI; Derogatis, 
1993), emotion perception (i.e., the Face Emotion Identifcation Task, FEIT; Kerr & Neale, 
1993), ToM (i.e., the Hinting task; Corcoran, Mercer, & Frith, 1995), and attributional style 
(i.e., the Ambiguous Intentions Hostility Questionnaire, AIHQ; Combs et al., 2007).  The 
AIHQ is a new measure of attributional stlye comprised of scenarios with negative outcomes 
that vary in intentionality (i.e., ambiguous, purposeful, and accidental; e.g., you are supposed 
to meet a new friend at a restaurant but she never shows up).  The participant’s task is to 
judge why the person likely acted the way s/he did.  An independent rater, blind to 
assessment status (pre or post-test), rated particpant responses on Likert-type scales for 
computing a hostility index; higher numbers reflect a greater tendency to attribute hostile 
intent to the story’s protagonist. 
Inspection of the table below reveals that SCIT was associated with a significant 
improvement in ToM, and trend-level improvements symptoms (including paranoid ideation) 
and attributional style (Penn et al., 2005), with effect sizes in the moderate to large range 
(Cohen, 1988). There was no impact of SCIT on emotion perception. Changes in social 
cognition could not be accounted for by a reduction in symptoms. These results indicate that 
SCIT is feasible and provide promising preliminary evidence that it is associated with 
improvement in specific aspects of social cognition.  
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Baseline and Post-Treatment Assessments for SCIT – Pilot study #1 
 n
Baseline 
M SD
Post-Treatment 
M SD F p d
BSI Total 
Score 6
61.3    
49.8  38.6    12.5 2.73 0.16 0.54 
BSI 
Paranoia 6
1.3      
1.0  0.7      0.6 1.48 0.28 0.61 
FEIT 7  11.32.6  11.3      2.6       0.00       1.00      0.00 
Hinting Task 7  12.14.8  15.3      3.4     14.60*   0.009 1.56 
AIHQ- 
Hostility  7
8.8      
4.2  6.7      1.8       5.94   0.059 0.49 
Five of the seven clients participated in a post-treatment focus group, and completed a 
survey rating the helpfulness of SCIT on a three-point scale.  The results of this survey, 
summarized below, reveal that participants found SCIT to be beneficial. 
 
Participant Feedback (n = 5) 
 No (%) Yes (%) Very Much (%) 
Were the materials understandable?  0 100 0 
Was the group useful? 20 60 20 
Did SCIT help you to think about social 
situations? 0 80 20
Did SCIT help you to relate to other 
people? 20 20 60 
Data and participant feedback from this first trial were used to guide modification of 
the treatment manual. Specific changes addressed the lack of participant improvement on 
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emotion perception measures and several client and practitioner comments about the clarity 
of specific instructions and exercises.  It was determined that the focused emotion perception 
intervention was too short. Additionally, because emotion perception training was provided 
at the beginning of the intervention, but was not reinforced over the final two-thirds of the 
protocol, we suspected that gains in this domain may have degraded by the post-test 
intervention. To address these issues, we added an additional session of emotion training to 
the protocol, and we built-in additional rehearsal of emotion perception skills throughout all 
three phases of the intervention. We also enhanced protocol instructions for eliciting facial 
mimicry from participants.  
 Additionally, we observed that clients’ whose illness presentation varied in terms of 
the prominence of positive symptoms (e.g. hallucinations and paranoid delusions) versus 
negative symptoms (e.g. cognitive impairment and affective flattening) benefited 
differentially from the various interventions. For example, individuals with prominent 
positive symptoms reported greater benefit from work on jumping to conclusions. Thus, we 
modified the manual to include suggestions based on the literature, client feedback, and our 
clinical experience for addressing the differing needs of clients who vary on this dimension. 
 Inpatient pilot study #2 
After updating the intervention based on data from pilot study #1, we collaborated 
with our partner research lab at the University of Tulsa to conduct a second inpatient pilot 
trial. Our goals with this trial were: 1) Evaluate the efficacy of the intervention in comparison 
to a control condition; 2) Evaluate the transportability of the intervention; 3) Further assess 
the clarity and acceptability of the intervention and treatment materials to clients and 
providers; and; 4) Explore whether SCIT also improves social functioning. 
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In this quasi-experimental trial (Combs et al., under review), eighteen inpatients with 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders completed SCIT and were compared with 10 inpatients 
who completed a coping skills group.  Participants were assessed at pre-test and post-test on 
measures of emotion perception, ToM, attributional style, cognitive flexibility, and social 
functioning.  To examine the effect of SCIT on real world behaviors, Combs et al. also 
recorded the frequency of aggressive incidents on the treatment ward.  As summarized in the 
table below, SCIT participants, as compared to the control group, improved significantly on 
all of the social cognitive measures. Participants also showed significantly better social 
functioning and fewer aggressive incidents on the treatment unit at post-test.   Importantly, 
these changes were independent of changes in clinical symptoms over time, and support the 
unique role of SCIT in remediating social cognitive deficits in schizophrenia.   
 
Baseline and Post-Treatment Assessments for SCIT – Pilot study #2 
Variable SCIT (n = 18) Control (n = 10) 
Pre-Test Post-Test Pre-Test Post-Test 
Face Emotion    
Identification 11.5 (2.6) 15.9 (1.5)* 9.3 (3.4) 10.3 (3.0) 
Hinting Task 13.6 (2.3) 19.8 (0.32)* 14.8 (3.3) 12.4 (3.7) 
AIHQ Hostility  
Ambiguous 2.0 (0.57) 1.3 (0.34)* 1.5 (0.56) 2.1 (0.44) 
Social Functioning - - - -
SFS Engagement 10.7 (1.6) 13.7 (1.0)* 10.6 (2.1) 10.4 (2.5) 
 SFS Interpersonal 6.8 (1.4) 8.6 (0.48)* 7.5 (1.3) 6.8 (1.8) 
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Incidents on Ward 2.9 (2.0) 1.0 (1.3)* 2.0 (1.4) 2.3 (1.7) 
* p <.01 (Group X Time Interaction; ANOVA); AIHQ = Ambiguous Intentions Hostility 
Questionnaire; SFS = Social Functioning Scale 
 
Following this trial, we made several additional modifications to the manual prior to 
outpatient testing. First, we further enhanced instructions for using facial mimicry during 
Phase 1 based on the experiences of the treatment providers in Tulsa. Second, we expanded 
instructions for eliciting disclosure of problematic interpersonal situations from clients in 
Phase 3. 
Finally, we modified instructions for generating alternative attributions during Phases 
2 and 3. Generating alternatives to a biased cognition is a foundational technique in cognitive 
therapy. However, research among non-ill individuals suggests that experiencing alternative-
generation as difficult may actually serve to reinforce an unwanted cognition (Sanna, 
Schwarz, & Stocker, 2002; Schwarz et al., 1991). This effect may have particular importance 
in schizophrenia where executive dysfunction and cognitive inflexibility make more difficult 
the process of generating alternative explanations. Thus, traditional alternative-generating 
techniques may be counter-productive in this population.  
We made two modifications to enable SCIT participants to flexibly consider 
alternative explanations while minimizing the risk described above. First, we now encourage 
the target person (i.e. the client with the identified interpersonal problem) to describe his or 
her initial conclusion (which is typically distressing, and often maladaptive). We then 
encourage other group members to generate alternative interpretations. It often is easier for 
others, who are not invested in the situation or target person’s initial conclusion, to generate 
alternatives. Moreover, to the extent that generating alternatives may be difficult for others, 
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we are not concerned about their subjective accessibility experiences, only those of the target 
person. Thus, theoretically it may be easier for the target person to appreciate alternative 
guesses when they are generated by others and the process is not experienced as effortful for 
him. A drawback of this method is that it requires a group, and therefore does not generalize 
as a technique that can be used in vivo by clients.  
We also use a second technique in which we attenuate the difficulty of generating 
alternatives by providing clients with an easy-to-remember framework that jump-starts their 
ability to generate three formally distinct attributions. Specifically, in situations in which the 
target person has drawn a externalizing-personalizing conclusion, we encourage him to 
generate a situation-based alternative conclusion, and an internalizing-personalizing 
conclusion. For example, if he has concluded that a coworker passed him without saying 
“Hi,” because the coworker is an ill-willed person, we would help the client to generate a 
situational attribution, such as that the coworker was upset because he had learned of the 
death of a relative, as well as an internal attribution, such as that the client himself may have 
played a role by not greeting the coworker. Learning and retention of this technique is 
facilitated by illustration and reinforcement of three ideal types: “Easy Eddie,” who always 
makes situational attributions, “Blaming Bill,” who always makes external personalizing 
attributions, and “My-fault Mary,” who always makes internal personalizing attributions. 
These characters are described in colorful, personal detail to facilitate their being committed 
to memory, and their function is reinforced throughout the latter half of the intervention. 
While discussing fictional vignettes or personal problems, clients are asked frequently, 
“What would Easy Eddie (or Blaming Bill or My-fault Mary) make of this situation?”  After 
these changes, SCIT was finalized for use in the current project. 
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The Current Project: Evaluation of SCIT among Outpatients 
Preliminary evidence supports SCIT’s efficacy among inpatients (Combs et al., 2007; 
Penn et al., 2005). However, the majority of individuals receiving treatment for 
schizophrenia do so in an outpatient environment, and increasing the proportion of outpatient 
versus inpatient services is a goal of many service systems. Therefore, the current project 
extended evaluation of SCIT to the outpatient context, with an initial, small-scale efficacy 
study (Study #1), followed by a small-scale effectiveness study (Study #2). Below, Study #1 
is presented, followed by a short discussion/summary of the findings, and then Study #2, also 
followed by a short discussion/summary.  The dissertation concludes with a larger general 
discussion that will synthesize the findings and implications across the studies. 
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Study #1
The goal of Study #1 was to conduct a preliminary investigation of SCIT’s efficacy in 
the outpatient setting. This was a quasi-experimental trial comparing SCIT to treatment-as-
usual (TAU) among individuals with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. Consistent with the 
inpatient findings, we predicted that SCIT would be associated with improved emotion 
perception and Theory of Mind, as well as reduced attributional bias, relative to the treatment 
as usual (TAU) condition. Secondary predictions were that SCIT-related changes would 
generalize to reduced Need for Closure and improved social skill performance.  
Method 
Treatment setting 
Participants were recruited from the Schizophrenia Treatment and Evaluation 
Program (STEP) at The University of North Carolina Neurosciences Hospital.  STEP is an 
outpatient clinic that provides specialty care to adults with schizophrenia and other psychotic 
disorders. It has a multidisciplinary focus and provides psychiatric assessment, medication 
management, individual and group psychotherapy, case management, family education and 
support, and occupational therapy.  STEP treats 250 individuals with psychotic disorders 
annually (95% with diagnoses of schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder), of which 36% 
are female, and 24% African-American.  The SCIT treatment was provided at the STEP 
clinic for two of the three psychotherapy group cohorts included in this study. For the third 
cohort, the treatment was provided at Caramore Community, Inc. in Carrboro, NC.  
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Caramore is a rehabilitation-oriented transitional residential and vocational training program 
for individuals with mental illnesses. The third group was held at this site because all 
members of this cohort were Caramore clients, and this site was more convenient for them.  
All three groups were led by two clinicians, one of the authors of the treatment 
manual  (D. Roberts) and a Master’s-level student in clinical psychology or social work. The 
clinicians had an average of 2.0 years of experience (SD = 1.4) working with clients with 
severe mental illness.  
Participants were recruited who met the following inclusion/exclusion criteria: (1) 
Diagnosis of schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder; (2) Reading ability above third grade 
level; (3) No diagnosis of current substance abuse or dependence; (4) Difficulty with social 
cognition or paranoia, as indicated by clinician or staff consensus of difficulty with social 
interactions and/or PANSS Paranoia/Suspiciousness score in the clinical range (i.e. 2 or 
above), and (5) Aged between 18 and 65.  All participants were receiving regular psychiatric 
treatment at STEP, including antipsychotic medication. 
 Participants were recruited into the SCIT treatment condition based on clinician- or 
self-referral. Participants were recruited into the TAU condition who either (1) were referred 
for SCIT participation and declined, but agreed to the TAU condition, (2) self-referred based 
on posted flyers at the STEP clinic, or (3) had participated in previous research with our 
laboratory, had agreed to be contacted for future research participation, and met study 
criteria.  
Measures 
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The assessment battery comprised three types of measures: Screening, primary 
outcomes, and secondary outcomes. Assessments were conducted by trained assessors who 
were not blind to treatment condition or pre/post status.  
Screening measures 
Diagnosis was obtained from participants’ medical charts, and confirmed by 
administration of an enhanced administration of the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale 
(Kay, Fiszbein, & Opler, 1987).  The PANSS is a commonly used 30-item interview measure 
that captures severity of positive and negative schizophrenia symptoms, as well as general, 
mood, and behavioral symptoms. Items are rated on a scale of 1 (absent) to 7 (severe), and 
yield three scaled scores: Positive symptoms, negative symptoms, and general symptoms. 
The PANSS is a valid and reliable instrument for use with this population (Kay, Opler, & 
Lindenmayer, 1988).  It was administered by assessors trained to reliability to a gold standard 
criterion (ICC > .70). The PANSS was enhanced with symptom duration items from the 
psychotic disorders section of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV- Patient Edition 
(SCID-P; First et al., 2001).   
 Reading level and IQ estimates were determined using the Wide Range Achievement 
Test-Revised: Reading (WRAT-R; Wilkinson, 1993), a brief test designed to assess reading 
ability.  The WRAT-R consists of a list of words of increasing difficulty that the participant 
must read aloud to the examiner. Higher scores signify stronger reading ability. The WRAT-
R has been normed and validated using a large, diverse sample (Jastak & Wilkinson, 1984).  
Reading ability has been found to function as an estimate of premorbid cognitive ability in 
schizophrenia (Dalby & Williams, 1986; Goldberg et al., 1995), and the WRAT-R has been 
used specifically for this purpose (Weickert et al., 2000).   
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Additional demographic and clinical information that was collected included: age, 
educational attainment, gender, and ethnic background, and current medications. 
 Primary outcomes 
In holding with the inpatient studies of SCIT, and with recommendations for early-
stage treatment development (Rounsaville et al., 2001), only a small set of primary outcome 
variables were assessed. These included emotion perception, Theory of Mind, and 
attributional bias—the three primary targets of the intervention.  
 Emotion perception was measured with the Face Emotion Identification Task (FEIT; 
Kerr & Neale, 1993).  The FEIT is comprised of 19 photographs of faces expressing one of 
six basic emotions (happy, sad, angry, afraid, surprised, and ashamed).  The participant’s task 
is to determine which of the six emotions is being expressed by each face.  Performance is 
indexed as the number of correct responses.  The FEIT has been widely used in emotion 
perception studies in schizophrenia (Mueser et al., 1996; Penn and Combs, 2000; Penn et al., 
2000; Pinkham & Penn, 2006; Salem, Kring, & Kerr, 1996).   
 Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) for the FEIT was .51. Although low, this is consistent 
with previous research that has used this measure (Kerr & Neale, 1993; Mueser et al., 1996; 
Penn et al., 2000).  Additionally, the widespread use of this measure and ease of 
comparability with other studies supports the use of this measure here despite its moderate 
reliability.    
 Theory of Mind was measured primarily with the Hinting task (Corcoran, Mercer, & 
Frith, 1995). The Hinting task consists of ten brief, written vignettes describing a social 
interaction between two characters that ends with one uttering a hint (e.g. “Gosh, these 
suitcases are heavy!”).   The participant must infer what the character really meant by the 
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hint (e.g., “Will you help me carry them?”). A correct inference receives 2 points.  If the 
respondent is incorrect, a second, more obvious hint is provided (e.g., “I don’t know if I can 
carry all three!”) and, if correct at this point, the respondent receives 1 point. Incorrect 
answers receive 0 points.  Scores on the Hinting task range from 0 to 20, with higher scores 
indicating better skills at inferring the desires of others. The Hinting task has been used in a 
variety of studies assessing ToM abilities in schizophrenia and has good psychometric 
properties (Corcoran, 2001; Marjoram et al., 2005; Tamasine, Bryson, & Bell, 2004). 
Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) for the Hinting task was .65. Exploration of the scale by 
deleting items yielded no acceptable subset of items with reliability in the acceptable range. 
Therefore the full scale was used in analyses. 
 Attributional style was measured with the Ambiguous Intentions Hostility 
Questionnaire (AIHQ; Combs et al., 2006).  The AIHQ is comprised of 15 short, written 
vignettes describing negative interpersonal events that vary in the intentionality of the 
characters (i.e., obviously intentional, ambiguous, and obviously accidental).  The participant 
is asked to read each vignette, to imagine the scenario happening to her or him (e.g., “You 
walk past a bunch of teenagers at a mall and you hear them start to laugh.”), and to write 
down the reason why they think the other person(s) acted that way toward them.  Two 
independent raters subsequently code this written response for the purpose of computing a 
“hostility bias” (described below).  The participant then rates, on Likert scales, whether the 
other person(s) performed the action on purpose (anchored by [1], definitely no, and [5], 
definitely yes), how angry it would make them feel (anchored by [1], not at all angry, and 
[5], very angry), and how much they would blame the other person(s) (anchored by [1], not
at all, and [5], very much).  Finally, the participant is asked to write down how s/he would 
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respond to the situation, which is later coded by two independent raters to compute an 
“aggression index” (described below). Thus, each of 15 items yields a Hostility score, an 
Intentionality score, an Anger score, a Blame score, and an Aggression score. The 
Intentionality, Anger, and Blame scores can be averaged to generate a “Blame composite” 
score that ranges from 1 to 5. The AIHQ has demonstrated good reliability and validity 
properties in two studies (Combs et al., 2007; Combs et al., 2006).   
 In the current study, only the Blame composite, Hostility, and Aggression scores for 
ambiguous situations were analyzed.  These scores show the strongest relationship with 
paranoia (Combs et al., 2007) and inpatient social behavior (Waldheter et al. 2005) as 
compared to a well-validated measure of attributional style, the Internal-Personal-Situational 
Attributions Questionnaire (IPSAQ; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996a).  Hostility and Aggression 
bias scores were independently rated by two research assistants on a 5-point Likert-type scale 
anchored by 1 (not at all hostile) to 5 (very hostile) and 1 (not aggressive) to 5 (physically 
aggressive), respectively.  Raters were blind to study condition and pre/post status. 
Agreement between raters (Intraclass Correlation Coefficient, ICC) was good, at .85. The 
reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of the Likert-rated Blame scores was .92.  
Secondary Outcomes 
The assessment battery was reviewed after completion of the first treatment cohort. 
At this time, four secondary outcome variables were added to the protocol to strengthen the 
measurement of key domains specified in our treatment model (Figure 1, page 29). These are 
described below, along with the rationale for adding each one. 
The Bell & Lysaker Emotion Recognition Task (BLERT) was added as a secondary 
measure of emotion perception in order to enhance the ecological validity of measurement in 
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this domain. The BLERT consists of 21 brief video scenes in which an actor utters an 
emotionally neutral phrase using emotionally salient facial expressions and vocal prosody. 
The participant must select which of six emotions the actor is expressing for each scene. 
Performance is indexed as the total number of correct responses, with a range from 0 to 21. 
Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of the BLERT was .77.  
The Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT; McDonald, Flanagan, Rollins, & 
Kinch, 2003) was added as a secondary measure of Theory of Mind. The TASIT was chosen 
because it is the most face-valid measure of real-world ToM, is robust against ceiling effects 
in this population (Robert Kern, personal communication), and is associated with social 
functioning among individuals with traumatic brain injury (McDonald, Flanagan, Martin, & 
Saunders, 2004) and schizophrenia (Robert Kern, unpublished data). 
 The TASIT presents participants with ten brief video-taped social vignettes depicting 
dissociation between a character’s words and his or her beliefs, intentions, or emotions 
(specifically in the form of sarcasm and “white lies”).  After each vignette the participant is 
asked four questions about the characters’ beliefs, intentions, and emotions, which must be 
answered with “Yes” or “No.” Performance is indexed as the total number of correct 
responses, ranging from 0 to 40. Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) for the TASIT was .81. 
 The Need for Closure Scale-Abbreviated (NCS-A; Kruglanski et al. 1993) was added 
to assess SCIT-related changes in Need for Closure. The NCS-A replaced the full-scale NCS, 
a similar, but considerably longer measure that had been used in Cohort 1. The NCS was 
discontinued because participants in the first cohort exhibited poor attention on the longer 
measure, and its reliability was low (Cronbach’s alpha = .62). The NCS-A is a 16-item self-
report questionnaire. Each item consists of a statement that the respondent rates on a 6-point 
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Likert-type scale (anchored by [1], strongly disagree, and [6], strongly agree) according to 
the criterion, “How much would you agree with the statement according to your attitudes, 
beliefs, and experiences?”  A representative item is, “When I need to solve a problem, I do 
not waste time by considering diverse points of view.” Performance is indexed as the sum of 
14 items. Two items comprise a “lie scale” and are not included in the total score.) The NCS-
A has a range from 14 to 84, with higher scores representing greater Need for Closure. This 
measure has shown good internal consistency and validity properties in previous research 
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).  Reliability for the NCS-A in cohorts 2 and 3 was good 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .85).  
 The Social Skills Performance Assessment (SSPA; Patterson et al., 2001) was added 
to the assessment battery in order to evaluate whether changes in social cognition generalize 
to changes in interpersonal functioning. The SSPA is a verbal role-play assessment in which 
the subject participates in two 3-minute role-play conversations (“scenes”) with the assessor 
on pre-determined topics (e.g. “Your landlord has not fixed a leak that you told him about 
last week, and now you are calling him on the phone to follow-up.”). Role-plays are tape-
recorded and rated by independent coders. The SSPA has good face validity as a social skill 
measure, and has shown excellent inter-rater reliability, good test-retest reliability, and good 
convergent validity with a measure of activities of daily living (Patterson et al., 2001).  
The SSPA was administered by assessors who were trained by reading the manual, 
conferring with a psychologist (DP), and discussing and establishing agreement on 
administration standards with assessors using the instrument in other studies with this 
population. Two coders, trained to reliability and blind to participants’ study condition, 
pre/post status, and performance on other measures, rated participants’ performance in the 
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audio-taped role-plays. Ratings were made of the following domains: interest/disinterest, 
speech fluency, clarity (logic and intelligibility of phrasing), focus (staying on topic), affect 
(appropriateness of paralinguistic behavior), social appropriateness (politeness, manners), 
submissiveness-versus-persistence (in one scene only), negotiation ability (in one scene 
only), and overall conversational effectiveness. Each domain was rated on a 5-point Likert-
type scale with higher scores signifying greater social skill. Domains were summed to yield 
total scores for each scene. 
A random sub-set of role-plays from three studies were used to train raters to 
adequate reliability (ICC>.70) on all social skill variables.  Inter-rater reliability was assessed 
again after all ratings had been made. On both scene 1 and scene 2, raters achieved an ICC of 
.82. Therefore the two scenes were collapsed into an overall composite social skill scale 
(overall ICC = .79), with a range from 16 to 80. The use of an overall composite social skill 
score is consistent with previous research in the area (Patterson et al., 2001), and is also 
appropriate given the small number of participants in this study.  
Overview of analytic techniques 
Efficacy-subset & intent-to-treat analyses 
 In an ideal study, all individuals would receive an optimal dose of treatment. In 
reality, the dosage clients receive varies widely due to treatment non-adherence, drop-out, 
and other factors (Peduzzi, Wittes, Detre, & Holford, 1993). A central problem in treatment 
outcome research is minimizing the bias introduced by this phenomenon. One approach has 
been to analyze only the data of those participants who receive an optimal dose of the 
intervention. This approach has been called “efficacy subset analysis,” because it provides a 
test of the efficacy of an intervention among the subset of individuals who receive the 
54
intervention as it is designed to be delivered. While common, efficacy subset analysis 
typically increases Type I error because it conflates treatment assignment with treatment 
compliance, a factor that is related to treatment outcome independent of intervention type, 
and therefore confounds causal conclusions (Lee, Ellenberg, Hirtz, & Nelson, 1991). To 
prevent this bias, intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis is advocated wherein data from all participants 
who are initially assigned to a treatment condition are included in post-intervention analysis 
regardless of the amount of treatment they actually receive (Lachin, 2000; Newell, 1992). 
This approach requires that post-treatment data be collected from all participants, regardless 
of whether they remained in treatment. ITT prevents Type I error inflation by eliminating 
self-selection bias, and has been advocated by NIH as the most appropriate technique for 
evaluating new therapies (Friedman, Furberg, & DeMets, 1998). However, a drawback to 
ITT is that it is particularly conservative and typically increases Type II error. This is because 
some individuals who do not receive the intervention, and thus show no change, are 
evaluated as if they had received the treatment (Gross & Fogg, 2004). In contrast to efficacy 
subset analysis, ITT analysis is considered an evaluation of a treatment’s effectiveness,
because it assesses a treatment’s effects in the real-world context of partial compliance. 
 Because neither efficacy-subset nor ITT analysis provides an unbiased estimate of an 
intervention’s effects, both may be used within a single study (August et al., 2000).  This 
approach enables evaluation of both the efficacy and the effectiveness of an intervention 
(Lachin, 2000). The current study’s hypotheses will be evaluated using both techniques, first 
studying the efficacy subset (i.e. “Completers”), and then the broader ITT sample. 
 Criteria for defining treatment completion in efficacy subset analysis depend on the 
characteristics of the intervention being studied. We operationalized the minimum acceptable 
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dose of SCIT as attending at least ten sessions (of 20 to 24 possible sessions), with at least 
two sessions in each of SCIT’s three phases. We required attendance at sessions in all three 
phases because the skills taught in SCIT are cumulative, with higher-level skills and real-
world application not being addressed until the second half of the intervention. Individuals 
who attended a minimum of ten sessions were categorized as “Completers,” and those who 
did not were categorized as “non-Completers.” 
 Missing data 
 There is no clearly-optimal method for imputing missing data in a longitudinal 
database (Little & Yau, 1996). Last Observation Carried Forward (LOCF) is one of several 
common imputation techniques used in treatment outcome research (Heyting, Tolboom, & 
Essers, 1992). Using LOCF, each missing observation is replaced with the most recent 
previous observation available for the variable and subject in question. LOCF has three key 
limitations. First, in studies such as the current one in which an active treatment is being 
compared to a control condition, LOCF is a particularly conservative approach because 
treatment participants with missing data are assumed not to improve after their final 
assessment. Second, because LOCF assumes that a subject’s last observed value on a given 
variable is the best estimate of his/her status on that variable at any future point in time, 
LOCF is a poor data imputation choice for the study of conditions that follow a predictable 
course (such as Alzheimer’s disease). Third, LOCF decreases variance on the variable in 
question. In databases with a high proportion of missing data and/or variables with naturally 
higher variance, this can have numerous negative effects, including inflation of Type I error.  
LOCF was used for ITT analyses in the present study because each of these 
limitations is considered acceptable in the current context. First, LOCF’s conservative effect 
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is acceptable because the ITT analyses are complimented in this study by Completer 
analyses, which are more liberally-biased. Regarding the second limitation, chronic 
schizophrenia does not follow a predictable downward course, and previous longitudinal 
studies with STEP clients suggest that this population is fairly stable (David Penn & Piper 
Meyer, personal communication). Third, there was a low rate of missing data in this study, 
minimizing the risks associated with decreased variance.  
There were no data missing from treatment Completers in this study, and therefore no 
data imputation was necessary in the efficacy-subset sample. 
Effect size estimates 
Within-group effect sizes were calculated to estimate the magnitude of change from 
pre- to posttest within the treatment condition. These effect sizes complement the inferential 
statistics, given the relatively small sample size in this study. 
Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1988) was calculated using Dunlap and colleagues’ conservative 
calculation, which corrects for effect size inflation due to within-variable correlation in 
paired samples (Dunlap, Cortina, Vaslow, and Burke, 1996). The formula is 
d = tc[2(1 – r)/n]1/2 
where tc is the t statistic for paired groups and r is the correlation across pairs of measures. 
The magnitude of effect sizes were evaluated according to Cohen’s recommended 
conventions: small (d = .20), medium (d = .50), and large (d = .80). 
Data analysis overview 
In order to minimize experiment-wise error, group differences on the primary social 
cognitive variables were first explored using repeated-measures multivariate analyses of 
variance (MANOVAs).  Group differences on the secondary outcome variables were tested 
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using mixed, repeated-measures ANOVAs. All significant interactions were probed with 
follow-up mean comparisons. Because of the small sample size and preliminary nature of this 
study, interactions that approached statistical significance (p < .15) were also probed 
(although conclusions regarding these findings will be tempered). 
Results  
Demographic and baseline clinical analyses 
Table 1 summarizes the demographic and baseline clinical characteristics of the SCIT 
and TAU groups. ANOVA and 2 tests revealed that the groups differed significantly in 
diagnostic make-up and baseline symptom levels. The potential impact of these differences 
on study hypotheses was probed. Within the full sample, bivariate correlations between 
baseline PANSS total symptoms and baseline social cognitive performance was non-
significant (r’s ranged from -.05 to .27) for all variables. Similarly, ANOVAs comparing 
baseline performance on the social cognitive variables across diagnostic categories were all 
non-significant (F’s ranged from .165 to 2.02). Therefore, these baseline differences were not 
addressed in further analyses of the social cognitive data. 
At baseline, PANSS total symptoms was significantly correlated with social skill 
performance (r = .678; p = .003). Therefore, following previous research in this area (Combs 
et al., 2007), a symptom change score ([pretest PANSS total – posttest PANSS total]/pretest 
PANSS total) was entered as a fixed covariate in analyses of social skill data.  
Comparison of the SCIT and TAU groups at baseline revealed no differences on any 
of the social cognitive or social skill measures.   
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Finally, recall that three different therapy cohorts received SCIT.  These cohorts did 
not differ significantly from one another on any baseline clinical, social cognitive, or social 
skill measures. Therefore, they were combined for all subsequent analyses.  
Intent-to-treat (ITT) and Completer samples. Twenty individuals agreed to participate 
in SCIT therapy. They constituted the ITT sample. Of these 20, 14 (70%) were categorized as 
Completers. Chi-square and t-tests revealed that they did not differ significantly from the six 
(30%) non-Completers on any of the demographic or baseline clinical measures. The 
attendance rates for the ITT and Completer samples were 64% and 82%, respectively. 
All 11 participants in the TAU sample completed baseline and posttest assessments. 
A subset of TAU participants did not complete several of the secondary measures because 
the measures were added to the battery after these participants’ baseline assessments were 
completed. 
Treatment findings 
 Completer sample1
The effects of SCIT on social cognition were examined with an omnibus 2 (time: 
pretest versus posttest) X 2 (group: TAU versus SCIT treatment completers) mixed model 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) conducted on the primary social cognitive 
measures (FEIT, AIHQ hostility bias, and Hinting task). The time x group interaction was 
statistically significant (Wilk’s  = .592; F = 4.82; p = .010). To probe this interaction, 
follow-up 2 (time) X 2 (group) ANOVAs were conducted on each of the three dependent 
 
1 The FEIT and Hinting task variable distributions were found to violate parametric statistics’ assumptions of 
normality. Therefore, the significance tests in this section were replicated using non-parametric Mann-Whitney 
and Wilcoxon change-score tests. Significance findings mirrored parametric results to an acceptable degree for 
both the FEIT (Mann-Whitney U = 24.00; Wilcoxon W = 90.00; p = .003) and the Hinting task (Mann-Whitney 
U = 74.50; Wilcoxon W = 140.50; p = .887). Thus, it was determined that assumption violations did not distort 
findings on these measures. 
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variables, and the two additional AIHQ variables (summarized in Table 2). For the FEIT 
(emotion perception task), neither of the main effects for time or treatment group was 
statistically significant. However, there was a significant time x group interaction (F = 13.27;
p = .001); SCIT completers improved significantly from pre- to posttest (F = 9.52; p = .009), 
whereas TAU participants’ performance declined at a trend level of statistical significance (F 
= 4.57; p = .06). The improved performance in the SCIT group corresponded to a medium 
within-group effect size. 
Neither the main effects nor the interaction for the Hinting (ToM) nor AIHQ 
(attributional) tasks was statistically significant.  
Intent-to-treat sample2
The above analyses were repeated with the larger ITT sample. The results were 
generally unchanged. The omnibus MANOVA conducted on the three primary social-
cognitive variables yielded a time x group interaction that reached a trend level of statistical 
significance (Wilk’s  = .772; F = 2.66; p = .069). As summarized in Table 3, this overall 
effect was a result of the significant time x group interaction on the FEIT (F = 7.04; p =
.013). Follow-up analyses revealed that the SCIT group improved from pre- to posttest at a 
trend level of statistical significance (F = 3.00; p = .100), whereas the TAU group showed 
the same trend-level performance decrement on the FEIT observed in the Completer sample. 
The SCIT group improvement corresponded to a small within group effect size. No other 
main effects or interactions were statistically significant.  
Secondary treatment findings 
 
2 As in the Completer sample, FEIT and Hinting task distributions were found to violate parametric statistics’ 
assumptions of normality. However, again, comparison of the parametric analyses in this section to analogous 
non-parametric analyses revealed that these violations did not distort findings on the FEIT (Mann-Whitney U = 
50.50; Wilcoxon W = 116.50; p = .013) or the Hinting task (Mann-Whitney U = 102.50; Wilcoxon W = 168.50; 
p = .742).  
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Completer Sample 
Results from a series of 2 X 2 ANOVAs on the secondary outcome variables are 
summarized in Table 4. On the BLERT, neither of the main effects for time or group was 
statistically significant. However, the time x group interaction approached a trend level of 
statistical significance (F = 3.27; p = .092); participants who received SCIT had (trend-level) 
higher performance on the BLERT at post-test relative to participants in the TAU group (t =
1.69; p = .11). 
On the TASIT, the time x group interaction approached statistical significance (F =
2.58; p = .128). Probing of this interaction revealed trend-level improvement in the SCIT 
group (F = 4.24; p = .070), and no improvement in the TAU group. The SCIT group’s 
improvement corresponded to a moderate effect size.  
Neither the main effects nor the interaction on the Need for Closure scale was 
statistically significant.  
A 2 (time) X 2 (group) analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted on the 
SSPA (social skill test) with PANSS symptom change score entered as a covariate. This 
yielded a statistically significant time x group interaction (F = 6.49; p = .024; depicted in 
Figure 2). Follow-up analyses revealed that participants who received SCIT improved 
significantly in social skill from pre- to posttest (F = 30.13; p = .001) whereas individuals 
who received TAU did not. The SCIT group’s improvement corresponded to a large effect 
size.  
ITT Sample 
Table 5 summarizes results from the secondary outcome measures in the full ITT 
sample. These results are consistent with those from the Completer sample.  The 2 X 2 
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ANOVA on the BLERT revealed a time-by-group interaction that reached a trend level of 
statistical significance (F = 3.91; p = .067). Follow-up analyses revealed that participants 
who received SCIT showed a pre to post-test improvement that reached a trend-level of 
statistical significance (F = 3.37; p = .096), corresponding to a small effect size (no 
significant improvement was observed in the TAU group).   
The ANCOVA conducted on the SSPA with symptom change score as a covariate 
produced a time x group interaction that approached statistical significance (F = 2.71; p = 
.121). Follow-up analyses revealed that the SCIT group improved significantly from pre- to 
posttest (F = 11.86; p = .006), whereas the TAU group did not.  
None of the main effects or interactions for the TASIT or NCS-A was statistically 
significant.  
Discussion 
Following promising findings from preliminary inpatient studies of SCIT, the current 
study compared SCIT to TAU among outpatients with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. It 
was hypothesized that SCIT would be associated with improved emotion perception, Theory 
of Mind, and social skill, as well as reduced attributional bias and Need for Closure. In 
general, most, but not all, hypotheses were supported, and the pattern of findings was 
consistent across both completer and intent-to-treat samples. Results are discussed in more 
detail below. 
Individuals who received SCIT showed significant improvement in emotion 
perception relative to TAU. This finding replicates the recent inpatient study of SCIT 
(Combs et al., 2007), and is consistent with previous research demonstrating that it is 
possible to modify performance in this domain among outpatients (reviewed in Couture et 
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al., 2006). SCIT differs from previous, “targeted” interventions, however, in that it addresses 
emotion perception as the first of three treatment phases (instead of as a stand-alone 
treatment). One result of this is that post-test assessment in SCIT does not occur until 
approximately four months after completion of targeted emotion perception training. Thus, 
the positive results in the current study suggest that emotion training effects in SCIT are 
fairly durable.  
The impact of SCIT on ToM varied depending on the nature of the task. Specifically, 
SCIT was not associated with improvement on the primary ToM measure, the Hinting task.  
This is a notable deviation from previous research with inpatient samples, which showed 
large improvement on this measure following SCIT (Penn et al., 2005; Combs et al., 2007). 
To better understand this null result, I examined the frequency distributions on this measure. 
This revealed that most (57%) SCIT treatment completers performed in the normative range 
at pretest (i.e. 17 or above, out of 20; Corcoran et al, 1995; Pinkham & Penn, 2006).  Thus, 
the null impact of SCIT on Hinting task performance may be due to ceiling effects.  
In contrast, SCIT was associated with trend-level improvements in ToM as measured 
by the TASIT. These results are consistent with previous research showing that social 
cognitive training programs can improve ToM among individuals with schizophrenia 
(Roncone et al., 2004).  It is also encouraging in that SCIT does not train clients in the ability 
to identify white lies and sarcasm, abilities assessed by the TASIT.  Thus, SCIT may have 
promise in improving “real-world” ToM, although this conclusion is tempered by the small 
sample in this study. 
SCIT did not reduce the hostile and aggressive attributional biases typically 
associated with paranoia. This finding was unexpected and not consistent with our previous 
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work with inpatients (Combs et al., 2007).  A comprehensive discussion of the likely reasons 
for this null effect will be presented in the General Discussion following Study #2. 
In general, SCIT did not impact Need for Closure, although the results were in the 
expected direction. Several factors may account for this null finding. First, SCIT 
interventions designed to increase cognitive flexibility and the ability to generate alternatives 
may not generalize to NFC. As an epistemological construct, NFC reflects peoples’ deeply 
held assumptions about the construction of truth and knowledge. Therefore, changes in this 
domain may occur more slowly than can be effected within the 5-month timeframe of SCIT. 
And second, the measure of NFC used in this study, the NCS-A, is face valid, and relies on 
the ability to reflect accurately on one’s mental tendencies.  This level of metacognition may 
not be possible for many individuals with schizophrenia (Frith, 1992), which could have 
decreased the validity of reporting on this measure. 
Perhaps the most promising finding in Study #1 was the impact of SCIT on social 
skill. This finding is quite encouraging given that the primary goal of SCIT is to improve 
social functioning by way of improved social cognition. This provides preliminary support 
both for the theoretical model underlying SCIT and for SCIT’s real-world utility, as it 
suggests that treatment effects generalize to actual behavior. 
Overall, the generally promising findings from this study are tempered by several 
limitations. The small sample size underscores the need for replication in a larger sample.  
The use of a quasi-experimental design prevents full confidence in attributing the observed 
effects solely to SCIT. And last, the use of non-blinded assessors may have increased effect 
sizes (Tarrier & Wykes, 2004). 
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Study #2
Study #1 demonstrated that SCIT is associated with improvement in social cognition 
and social functioning in outpatients with schizophrenia when implemented by individuals 
who developed the treatment. In Study #2, we conducted a preliminary evaluation of SCIT’s 
real-world effectiveness when implemented at sites, and by clinicians, not affiliated with the 
SCIT development team. As noted in the introduction, research on a treatment’s effectiveness 
and transportability is traditionally reserved until after randomized, controlled study of its 
efficacy. However, more recent models have highlighted the benefits of integrating 
effectiveness studies earlier in the development process (e.g. Weisz et al., 2004). To this end, 
the purpose of Study #2 was to conduct an initial evaluation of SCIT’s effectiveness using a 
pre/post, open-trial design. Recruitment, implementation, and outcome assessment were 
designed to maximize research rigor within the resource limitations of community mental 
health settings.  It was predicted that SCIT would be associated with improvements in the 
three domains of social cognition targeted by the intervention: emotion perception, ToM, and 
attributional style, with effect sizes likely smaller than in study #1. 
Method 
Treatment setting 
SCIT groups were conducted in New York City in collaboration with Federation 
Employment and Guidance Services (FEGS) and The Bridge, Inc. Groups were conducted at 
three rehabilitation-oriented treatment centers for individuals with severe and persistent 
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mental illnesses: (1) FEGS Intensive Psychiatric Rehabilitation Program (IPRT), a five-day-
a-week program with the mission of enhancing clients’ functioning in working, living, 
learning, and socializing; (2) the FEGS Onsite Rehabilitation Program at Riverdale Manor 
Home for Adults, a supported living facility that offers a spectrum of psychotherapeutic and 
case-management services to its residents, and; (3) The Bridge Continuing Day Treatment 
(CDT) program, which provides a spectrum of rehabilitation-oriented outpatient services 
with the mission of promoting independent living and self-sufficiency for its clients.  
Across sites, SCIT was offered as an adjunct to routine care, and followed the 
manual-specified schedule of 20 to 24 sessions over approximately five months. Each group 
was led by two clinicians (three with bachelor’s degrees and three with master’s degrees). 
The clinicians had an average of 8.1 years of experience (SD = 7.3) working with clients with 
severe mental illness. 
Participants 
Treatment participants were recruited by agency clinicians using the inclusion criteria 
from Study #1 as a guideline, in combination with the clinical goals of the program and the 
perceived treatment needs of individual clients. Clients who agreed to participate provided 
informed consent. There was no control condition, and all participants were receiving regular 
psychiatric treatment and were taking antipsychotic medications (Table 6). 
Measures 
Demographic and clinical information. Treating clinicians collected baseline data on 
age, gender, ethnicity, diagnosis, years of education, medications, and living status from 
participants’ medical charts. 
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Outcome measures. Resources were not available to conduct extensive, one-on-one 
assessments with all participants. Thus, only the primary social cognitive measures from 
Study #1 were used, including the FEIT, Hinting task, and AIHQ (described above). These 
measures were modified in order to enable them to be administered by treating clinicians in 
group format. They were administered during the first three and final three meetings of the 
SCIT treatment groups. Because SCIT calls for groups to be co-facilitated by two clinicians, 
during assessment sessions, one clinician presented assessment instructions and testing 
stimuli while the other clinician ensured that participants understood the directions and 
assisted those with special needs (e.g. language deficits).  
Fidelity and supervision. Group facilitators read the SCIT treatment manual, attended 
a half-day workshop (conducted by D. Penn), and consulted with Penn and Roberts prior to 
initiating treatment. Facilitators participated in weekly supervision calls with Penn and 
Roberts. No formal measure of treatment fidelity was administered. 
Data analytic plan 
As in Study #1, the ITT sample was comprised of all participants who agreed to 
treatment. Those who attended at least ten sessions (with at least two in each phase) were 
categorized as Completers. Separate analyses were conducted on the ITT and Completer 
samples3.
An initial repeated-measures MANOVA was conducted on the primary social 
cognitive variables (FEIT, Hinting task, and AIHQ hostility bias). Follow-up paired-samples 
t-tests were used to explore the statistical significance of pre-to-posttest change on these 
 
3 Because all assessments were conducted in group format, it was not possible to collect post-test data from 
individuals who dropped out of the SCIT group. In this sample, all non-Completers were drop-outs. Thus, all 
post-test data for non-Completers in this study were imputed, using LOCF, by carrying forward pretest scores. 
As a result, the ITT sample represents a particularly conservative effectiveness estimate because no treatment 
gain from any non-Completers was captured in post-test data. 
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three variables individually, as well as on the other two AIHQ variables (aggression bias and 
blame score). Within-group effect sizes (Cohen’s d) were calculated using the same method 
as was used in Study #1 (described above). 
Results 
Demographic characteristics of the sample are summarized in Table 6. The three 
therapy cohorts did not differ significantly from one another on any demographic or baseline 
social-cognitive variables. Therefore, they were combined for all subsequent analyses. 
Intent-to-treat (ITT) and Completer samples. Twenty-nine individuals agreed to 
participate in SCIT. They constituted the ITT sample. Of these 29, 20 (69%) were 
categorized as Completers. Attendance rates for the ITT and Completer samples were 67% 
and 83%, respectively. Chi-square and t-tests revealed that Completers did not differ 
significantly from non-Completers on any of the demographic or baseline social-cognitive 
measures. 
Treatment findings 
 Completer sample 
 The omnibus repeated measures MANOVA conducted on the primary social 
cognitive variables was statistically significant (F = 6.23; p = .006), indicating an overall 
change in social cognition from pre- to posttest. Participants showed a trend level 
improvement in FEIT (emotion perception) performance (t = 1.73; p = .101), and a 
significant improvement in Hinting task (ToM) performance (t = 3.24; p = .004), both of 
which correspond to a small effect size.  No other significant effects were observed.  
 ITT Sample 
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Results from the ITT sample (summarized in Table 8) were consistent with those 
from the Completer sample. The omnibus MANOVA was statistically significant (F = 4.64;
p = .010) and within group improvement again approached statistical significance for the 
FEIT ( t= 1.70; p=.101), and was statistically significant for the Hinting task (t = 3.02;
p=.005). 
Discussion 
 This study was designed to test SCIT’s effectiveness at improving targeted social 
cognitive domains within the real-world context of community mental health clinics. It was 
predicted that SCIT participants would exhibit improvements in emotion perception and 
ToM, and a reduction in attributional bias. As in Study #1, the majority of results were 
positive, and effects were similar across the intent-to-treat and Completer samples. Findings 
are discussed in more detail below.  
 SCIT was associated with an improvement in emotion perception that approached 
statistical significance. As expected, the effect sizes were attenuated relative to Study #1. 
This may be due to differences in how community clinicians implemented the emotion 
training phase of SCIT (compared to those in Study #1) and/or differences in sample 
characteristics across the two studies4, or some combination thereof. In future research on the 
transportability of SCIT to community settings, a measure of treatment fidelity may help 
disentangle these issues. 
 Participants in both the Completer and ITT samples improved significantly in Theory 
of Mind performance, replicating findings from the two inpatient studies of SCIT (Combs et 
al., 2007; Penn et al., 2005). This finding contrasted with Study #1, in which no improvement 
 
4 Compared to participants in Study #1, those in Study #2 exhibited significantly lower pretest FEIT scores (p < 
.001), were significantly older (p < .05), and were more likely to be living in group homes (p < .01). 
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was observed on the Hinting task. Participants in Study #2 were more impaired at pre-test 
relative to participants in Study #1 on this task (p = .012), which strengthens the conclusion 
that the findings from Study #1 were confounded by a ceiling effect.  ToM findings from 
Study #2 are promising from the standpoint of transportability. In contrast to emotion 
perception, ToM is addressed in a relatively diffuse manner within SCIT. Whereas the 
manual does include numerous specific prompts for group leaders to ask perspective-taking 
questions, clinicians also are encouraged to cultivate a perspective-taking environment 
throughout the treatment, and to find opportunities to help clients link perspective-taking to 
the more concrete emotion-perception and alternative-generating skills that they develop. 
Thus, the current finding suggests that the SCIT treatment manual (and weekly supervision) 
effectively communicated these non-specific aspects of ToM training to clinicians. 
 As in Study #1, participants’ pre- and posttest attributional bias appeared to be in the 
low-normal range, rendering moot the possibility of meaningful decrease in this domain. This 
finding is addressed in the General Discussion, below. 
Study #2 had several notable limitations. This was a small, uncontrolled study that 
used a convenience sample. Additionally, assessments were administered (1) by the treating 
clinicians, (2) in group format, and (3) using modified measures. All three of these factors 
threaten the validity of assessment results, and the first two could have inflated the study’s 
findings (Tarrier & Wykes, 2004). These threats are an artifact of limited agency resources, 
and were recognized prior to data collection. We sought to offset their effects by conducting 
both ITT and Completer analyses, the former of which was a highly conservative estimate of 
treatment effectiveness. The general consistency of findings across these analyses 
strengthens our confidence in the conclusions we have drawn. Nonetheless, this analytic 
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method is imperfect, and as the emphasis on effectiveness research in mental health grows, 
there is continued need for novel methods of maximizing assessment validity while 
minimizing agency cost and client burden.  
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General Discussion 
 Following a treatment-development phase, and evaluation of SCIT among inpatients, 
the current project was a preliminary evaluation of SCIT among outpatients. Study #1 used a 
quasi-experimental design to assess efficacy in a North Carolina (NC) sample, and Study #2 
used an uncontrolled, pre-post design to assess effectiveness in a New York (NY) sample. 
Results were generally promising, as SCIT participants in both studies showed evidence of 
improvement in most outcome domains. Results are discussed in more detail below. 
 Emotion perception. In general, there was relative convergence across studies on the 
impact of SCIT on emotion perception; SCIT participants in both studies showed 
improvement in this domain that reached small to medium effect sizes. Thus, these findings 
lend preliminary support to the ability of SCIT to improve emotion perception among 
outpatients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders. 
In the future, the kind of cross-sample performance variability observed in this study 
may be explored by conducting assessments both immediately after the emotion training 
module, and at treatment posttest. Combs and colleagues piloted this data-collection 
approach in their inpatient study of SCIT, and found that gains achieved during targeted 
emotion training had not decayed by the time of post-intervention assessment (Dennis 
Combs, personal communication). This finding lends support to the effectiveness of both the 
targeted emotion training and the subsequent rehearsal and reinforcement techniques used in 
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SCIT. Research in this vein can help to explain discrepant treatment findings across study 
groups and to clarify how emotion perception gains are achieved and maintained over time. 
Despite strong evidence that emotion perception can be improved, the literature 
remains unclear about whether improvements generalize to improvements in social 
functioning (Couture et al., 2006). Study #1 provided tentative evidence toward this link, as 
concomitant improvements were recorded in emotion perception and social skill. To provide 
more direct evidence, future research on SCIT should also assess social functioning 
immediately following emotion training. To the extent that generalization to social 
functioning involves delayed effects, more complex methodologies may be necessary to 
disentangle the effects of emotion training from attributional and ToM training. For example, 
multiple-baseline or other dismantling methodologies may be necessary.  
A final issue regards the ecological validity of emotion perception training. Does 
improvement in identifying facial expressions of emotion in static, posed, black-and-white 
photographs correspond to improvement in identifying human emotion in real-world 
settings? This issue poses a Hobson’s choice to treatment researchers. “Teaching to the test” 
will yield greater effect sizes but may not generalize to social functioning. On the other hand, 
using more ecologically valid intervention methods may enhance “real-world” emotion 
perception, but these gains may not be captured by current assessment measures. The 
emergence of more ecologically valid instruments, such as the BLERT, may help to resolve 
this tension. In Study #1, we added the BLERT to the assessment battery, and found evidence 
that SCIT participants did not improve as much on this measure as on the FEIT. Thus, it may 
be necessary for future iterations of SCIT to target more explicitly participants’ processing of 
vocal prosody, dynamically changing facial cues, and other real-world indicators of emotion. 
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Theory of Mind. There was mixed support for the impact of SCIT on ToM, with 
stronger evidence emerging from the NY sample than from the NC sample. This finding was 
unexpected in light of the consistently strong ToM results observed in the inpatient studies of 
SCIT (Combs et al., 2007; Penn et al., 2005).  
A likely explanation for this discrepancy is a ceiling effect among NC participants on 
the primary ToM measure, the Hinting task. This ceiling effect is consistent with previous 
research on ToM in high-functioning samples (Hogarty et al., 2004; Robert Kern, personal 
communication), and with the fact that ToM deficits may be episode-dependent in 
schizophrenia (Brune, 2005b). If the ceiling effect observed in the current study is indeed 
valid, it begs the question of whether ToM training is either possible or necessary among 
higher functioning individuals. Results from the TASIT, our secondary measure of ToM, 
suggest that there is in fact room for ToM improvement in this population, and that SCIT 
may hold promise in this regard, as improvement on the TASIT corresponded to a medium 
effect size. However, this conclusion is tempered by the small sample size and the lack of 
random assignment in the current study. At this point, all that can be concluded is that SCIT 
may improve ToM in a higher functioning sample (if one uses the TASIT), and that the 
TASIT may be sensitive to change. 
Attributional bias. SCIT did not have an impact on attributional bias in either study.  
This null effect may be understood by examining the descriptive statistics for the AIHQ. 
Specifically, means at both pre- and posttest on all three attributional bias scales (hostility, 
aggression, and blame) were lower than means produced by a normative sample of college 
students (Combs et al., 2007). This suggests a floor effect such that SCIT participants were 
actually less biased than non-ill controls, and therefore had little room for improvement.   
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Several factors may explain this floor effect. First, participants may in fact be 
elevated in attributional biases, but may have underreported them due to the desire to not 
appear paranoid or blaming. As an explicit measure, the AIHQ does not protect against this 
possibility. This problem could possibly be addressed through use of an implicit measure of 
attributional style, such as the Pragmatic Inference Test (Winters and Neale, 1985). A second 
possibility is that participants in this sample actually experienced low levels of attributional 
bias. This bias is strongly associated with persecutory delusions and paranoia (Bentall et al., 
2001; Garety & Freeman, 1999), both of which were low among NC participants. In contrast, 
inpatient samples whose attributional biases have improved following SCIT exhibited 
relatively high baseline scores in these domains (Combs et al., 2007). A final possibility is 
that low scores on the aggression scale of the AIHQ may reflect hesitance to engage other 
people, or passivity. Low scores correspond to statements such as “I would do nothing” in 
responses to a negative interpersonal event (such as being stood-up for an appointment). 
High levels of self-isolation and interpersonal passivity have been associated with 
schizophrenia (Rector, Beck, & Stolar, 2005), and may represent a stronger and more 
disabling bias than the aggressive response bias among some individuals with this illness. 
Thus, it might be necessary to reconceptualize this “aggression” scale so that moderate scores 
are viewed as optimal, and low scores are viewed as maladaptively passive. For some SCIT 
clients, the goal might be to increase assertiveness, rather than reduce aggression. 
The social skill improvement observed in Study #2 is particularly promising as we are 
aware of only one other study that has shown social functioning improvement following a 
purely social cognitive intervention (Roncone et al., 2004). SCIT participants’ social skill 
improvement corresponded to the largest effect size observed across all domains, which is 
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clinically promising because the social skill measure is both the most ecologically valid 
instrument that we used and the measure that best captures SCIT’s ultimate outcome goal. 
Future research is necessary to replicate this finding and to evaluate its generalization to 
more distal domains of social functioning, such as vocational achievement and social 
satisfaction.  
 The current project had several methodological limitations in addition to the potential 
measurement limitations described above. First, although the raters of social cognitive bias 
and social skill measures were blind to treatment and pre/post status, the assessors were not. 
This is an important limitation, as Tarrier and Wykes (2004) have identified non-blinded 
assessment as a key source of treatment-effect inflation among studies of CBT for psychosis. 
Second, neither study used a fully randomized-controlled design. Therefore inferences of 
causality are not possible. Third, small sample size limited power to detect change across 
variables. These limitations are being addressed in an NIMH-funded randomized, controlled 
trial scheduled to begin later this year.  
Looking toward the future, the current findings suggest that measurement may be a 
rate-limiting factor in the development of social cognitive interventions. More basic research 
is needed to ensure that social cognitive instruments are valid, maximally correlated with 
social functioning, and sensitive to change. Additionally, there is need for increased 
measurement of theoretically important domains that have not been assessed in this or other 
intervention studies, including metacognition and mirror neuron activity. In the meantime, 
treatment developers should resist the temptation to develop interventions that “teach to the 
test” without establishing a sound theoretical basis linking intervention techniques to putative 
etiological factors. 
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Last, in order to maximize the clinical efficiency of social cognition training, 
measurement approaches are needed that can discriminate clients who are appropriate for 
social cognitive- versus neurocognitive intervention. As reviewed in the introduction, social 
cognition and neurocognition appear to contribute independent variance to social 
functioning. However, current measures of social cognition lack the specificity to 
discriminate at the client level which of these domains is contributing to abnormal 
performance. Thus, a client with relatively intact social cognition may perform poorly on a 
ToM task because of cognitive deficits. Screening instruments that employ discrimination 
methods, such as signal detection (cf. Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Belezza, & Bower, 1981) 
or process dissociation (Jacoby, 1991) may differentiate clients’ needs and thereby maximize 
treatment effects as well as client satisfaction. 
In closing, this study showed that SCIT is a feasible and promising method for 
improving social cognition among outpatients. It is hoped that upcoming research will yield 
further evidence of its benefit to social functioning, and that SCIT will become an effective 
tool to help individuals with schizophrenia to build satisfying, socially integrated lives.   
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Table 1  
 
Study 1 Demographic and Clinical Information 
 SCIT 
(n = 20)
Control 
(n = 11) 
Mean / % SD Mean / % SD 
Age 36.8 12.3 41.4 12.3 
Female (%) 45.0  36.0  
Ethnicity (%)     
 African Am. 25.0  18.2  
 Caucasian 75.0  72.7  
 Other 0.0  9.1  
Diagnosis (%) *     
 Schizophrenia 35.0  81.8  
 Schizoaffective 65.0  18.2  
Yrs education 13.9 3.6 14.0 1.8 
WRAT – Reading 44.4 8.3 47.7 6.0 
Living status (%)     
 Independent 35.0  54.5  
 Family home 15.0  9.1  
 MH supported 30.0  18.2  
 Group home 20.0  18.2  
PANSS Symptoms† 67.9  11.7 51.3  10.0 
MH supported = Apartment with functional supports from a mental health provider 
* Diagnosis: Z2 = 6.23; p = .013
† Symptoms: t = 3.97; p < .001
Table 2
Study 1 Completer sample, primary social cognitive outcomes
SCIT (n = 14) TAU (n = 11)
Pretest
M (SD)
Posttest
M (SD)
Within SCIT
effect size (d) Pretest
M (SD)
Posttest
M (SD)
Within TAU
effect size (d)
FEIT* 12.21 (2.39) 13.57 (2.82) .50 13.73 (2.05) 12.54 (2.21) - .55
Hinting task 16.14 (2.66) 15.92 (2.59) - .08 15.45 (2.94) 15.27 (3.38) - .06
AIHQ Hostility 1.97 (0.61) 2.11 (0.70) .22 1.70 (0.48) 1.51 (0.60) - .35
AIHQ Aggression 1.79 (0.33) 1.89 (0.27) .31 1.95 (0.33) 1.98 (0.52) .05
AIHQ Blame 2.90 (1.04) 2.93 (0.95) .03 2.50 (1.01) 2.26 (0.73) - .22
* Significant time X group interaction (p = .001)
SCIT = Social Cognition and Interaction Training; TAU = Treatment as usual; FEIT = Face Emotion Identification Task; AIHQ =
Ambiguous Intentions Hostility Questionnaire
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Table 3
Study 1 Intent-to-treat sample, primary social cognitive outcomes
SCIT (n = 20) TAU (n = 11)
Pretest
M (SD)
Posttest
M (SD)
Within SCIT
effect size (d) Pretest
M (SD)
Posttest
M (SD)
Within TAU
effect size (d)
FEIT* 12.15 (2.78) 12.95 (3.02) .28 13.73 (2.05) 12.54 (2.21) - .55
Hinting task 15.90 (2.77) 15.80 (2.73) - .08 15.45 (2.94) 15.27 (3.38) - .06
AIHQ Hostility 1.94 (0.56) 2.06 (0.71) .19 1.70 (0.48) 1.51 (0.60) - .35
AIHQ Aggression 1.91 (0.36) 1.94 (0.27) .11 1.95 (0.33) 1.98 (0.52) .05
AIHQ Blame 2.77 (0.93) 2.75 (0.87) - .02 2.50 (1.01) 2.26 (0.73) - .22
* Significant time X group interaction (p = .013)
SCIT = Social Cognition and Interaction Training; TAU = Treatment as usual; FEIT = Face Emotion Identification Task; AIHQ =
Ambiguous Intentions Hostility Questionnaire
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Table 4
Study 1, Completer sample, secondary outcomes
SCIT TAU
Pretest M (SD) Posttest M(SD)
N
Within
SCIT effect
size (d) Pretest M (SD) Posttest M(SD)
N
Within
TAU effect
size (d)
BLERT 15.57 (3.26) 16.50 (2.22) 10 .29 14.12 (5.52) 13.00 (5.93) 7 - .19
TASIT 26.30 (6.90) 29.50 (5.72) 10 .50 27.38 (5.42) 27.50 (5.73) 8 .02
SSPA* 55.33 (5.17) 62.61 (6.56) 9 1.17 58.64 (4.10) 59.00 (6.46) 7 .06
NCS-A 50.44 (10.36) 47.78 (11.56) 9 - .24 46.13 (15.11) 50.13 (8.82) 8 .15
* Significant time X group interaction (p = .024)
BLERT = Bell & Lysaker Emotion Recognition Task; TASIT = The Awareness of Social Inference Test; SSPA = Social Skill
Performance Assessment; NCS-A = Need for Closure Scale – Abbreviated
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Figure 2
Study 1, treatment group X time interaction effects for the Social Skill Performance Assessment
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Table 5
Study 1, Intent-to-treat sample, secondary outcomes
SCIT TAU
Pretest M (SD) Posttest M(SD)
N
Within
SCIT effect
size (d) Pretest M (SD) Posttest M(SD)
N
Within
TAU effect
size (d)
BLERT 15.60 (3.26) 16.64 (2.16) 11 .35 14.12 (5.52) 13.00 (5.93) 7 - .19
TASIT 27.08 (6.49) 29.46 (5.19) 13 .39 27.38 (5.42) 27.50 (5.73) 8 .02
SSPA 55.50 (5.30) 61.05 (7.71) 11 .79 58.64 (4.10) 59.00 (6.46) 7 .06
NCS-A 49.38 (11.03) 48.31 (12.34) 13 - .09 46.13 (15.11) 50.13 (8.82) 8 .15
BLERT = Bell & Lysaker Emotion Recognition Task; TASIT = The Awareness of Social Inference Test; SSPA = Social Skill
Performance Assessment; NCS-A = Need for Closure Scale - Abbreviated
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Table 6 
 
Study 2, Demographic information 
 SCIT 
(n = 30)
Mean / % SD 
Age (years) 53.4 12.2 
Female (%) 53.0  
Ethnicity (%)   
 African Am. 43.3  
 Caucasian 36.7  
 Hispanic 20.0  
Diagnosis (%)   
 Schizophrenia 43.3  
 Schizoaffective 20.0  
 Psychosis NOS 3.3  
 Bipolar d/o 1.3  
 MDD with  
 psychotic feat. 1.0  
 Other 1.0  
Yrs education  13.2 3.3 
Living status (%)   
 Independent 13.3  
 MH supported 26.7  
 Group home 60.0  
MH supported = Apartment with functional  
 supports from a mental health provider 
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Table 7 
 
Study 2, Completer sample, treatment outcomes 
Variable SCIT (N = 20) Pretest M (SD)        Posttest M (SD) d
FEIT* 9.56 (3.28) 10.72 (3.10) .37 
Hinting task 13.60 (4.11) 15.40 (4.49) .44 
AIHQ Hostility  1.83 (0.71) 1.80 (0.14) .06 
AIHQ Aggression 1.79 (0.35) 1.80 (0.07) .02 
AIHQ Blame  2.77 (0.90) 2.67 (0.61) .10 
* The N for this test was 18 instead of 20 because one treatment completer  
did not attend the session at which the pretest FEIT was conducted and one  
did not attend the session at which the posttest was conducted. 
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Table 8 
 
Study 2, Intent-to-treat sample, treatment outcomes 
Variable SCIT (N = 29) Pretest M (SD)          Posttest M (SD) d
FEIT* 10.28 (2.91) 11.00 (2.66) .25 
Hinting task 13.62 (3.60) 14.86 (3.98) .32 
AIHQ Hostility  1.81 (0.70) 1.79 (0.65) .04 
AIHQ Aggression  1.81 (0.33) 1.82 (0.30) .03 
AIHQ Blame  2.76 (0.99) 2.69 (0.83) .08 
* N = 27, per note in Table 7 
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